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Chapter 1 develops a two-period general equilibrium trade-theoretic model to examine
if foreign aid discourages the recipient countries from pursuing trade liberalization. In the
model, foreign aid is given to the recipient in period two and its amount is negatively
related to the period-one real income. The recipient optimally chooses a tari¤ on imports.
It can also choose domestic investment endogenously in period one, and this choice has an
important bearing on our main result. We consider two variants of the model depending
upon whether the recipient can or cannot have access to international borrowing. In the
case without international borrowing, when domestic investment is exogenous, optimal
tari¤ is zero. In contrast, when domestic investment is endogenous, optimal tari¤ is
positive. This positive optimal tari¤ is induced by the link of aid negatively to the
period-one real income. In the case with international borrowing, even though domestic
investment is exogenous, optimal tari¤ is positive. But the reason for the positive tari¤ is
its benecial e¤ect on an improvement in the terms-of-trade of international borrowing.
When, in addition, domestic investment is endogenous, the tying of aid increases positive
optimal tari¤s further.
Chapter 2 develops a microeconomic model of health policies and the optimal
allocation of health aid in a poor recipient country. In the model, each poor household in
the country chooses the optimal number of sick children taken to hospitals to maximize its
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lifetime utility. There are three policy options for policymakers to improve public health:
raising the quality of health care, providing more preventive care and reducing the cost of
health care. We examine how three policy options inuence the optimal number of sick
children who are medically treated. Also, the countrys health authority allocates health
aid for three policy options to support poor householdslifetime utility maximization. We
nd that more health aid should be allocated for cost reduction in health care so as to help
poor households maximize their lifetime utility.
Chapter 3 primarily examines the hypothesis that there is heterogeneity in health aid,
that is, di¤erent types of health aid work di¤erently for health outcomes in aid-recipient
countries. In order to test our hypothesis, we rst disaggregate health aid per capita data
into three policy options: health aid per capita for improving the quality of health care,
health aid per capita for providing preventive care and health aid per capita for reducing
the cost of health care. Then, we empirically examine the e¤ects of disaggregated health
aid on three di¤erent health indicators: child mortality, life expectancy and death rate.
Using a panel data set of 119 aid-recipient countries from 1975 and 2010, we nd
supporting evidence for the hypothesis of heterogeneity in health aid. We nd no empirical
evidence of the benecial e¤ects of health aid on reducing child mortality. In contrast, we
nd that an improvement in life expectancy and a reduction in death rate are driven
mostly by health aid for reducing the cost of health care. We also nd that there is
heterogeneity in the allocation of health aid. Health aid for preventive care and the cost
reduction of health care is allocated by the needs of the recipients. However, more health
aid for the quality of health care ows to countries with better health status.
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CHAPTER 1
DOES FOREIGN AID DISCOURAGE TRADE LIBERALIZATION? A THEORETICAL
ANALYSIS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years Kenya has performed a curious mating ritual with its aid donors.
The steps are: one, Kenya wins its yearly pledges of foreign aid. Two, the government
begins to misbehave, backtracking on economic reform and behaving in an authoritarian
manner. Three, a new meeting of donor countries looms with exasperated foreign
governments preparing their sharp rebukes. Four, Kenya pulls a placatory rabbit out of the
hat. Five, the donors are mollied and the aid is pledged. The whole dance then starts
again. (The Economist, 1995)
The above describing the aid donor-recipient table between the Kenyan government
and the donor countries has been quoted by the voluminous literature on foreign aid (see,
for example, Dollar and Easterly, 1999; Kanbur, 2000; Svensson, 2000b) to show how
foreign aid obstructs policy reform in aid-recipient countries. In the quotation above, the
Kenyan government decided to undo their policy reform and receive foreign aid rather than
to endure the hardships of reform and achieve sustainable economic growth. But this may
not be an issue only in Kenya but in most recipient countries.
Foreign aid is originally designed for helping poor countries achieve sustainable
economic growth and poverty reduction. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that foreign aid
is at least partly disbursed by the needs of the recipients.1 The idea that more aid should
be disbursed to poorer countries has been taken for granted. Quoting passages from
Pearson Commission (1969) and Commission for Africa (2005), Easterly (2007) shows that
1In reality, of course, aid allocation is not only driven by the needs of the poor recipients but also
by the self-interest motives of the donors. For example, aid is in part given as an incentive to reward
political reforms. See Maizels and Nissanke (1984), Trumball and Wall (1994), Alesina and Dollar (2000),
Burnside and Dollar (2000), Alesina and Weder (2002) and Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2007) for the detailed
information of the determinants of aid.
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this idea has been widely supported in the aid sector from the past to the present.2 Also,
Birdsall and Williamson (2002) advocate the reform of the current aid architecture and
make sure that their "new aid architecture" implies that both fundamental reform in the
way aid delivered and a substantial increase in the volume of aid to the worlds poorest
countries for the next decade and beyond (p. 101).Easterly and Pfutze (2008) conrm
that, in reality, more aid is being directed towards the poorest countries. They nd that,
since the 1960s, about 60% of total aid has been headed to low-income countries, that is,
the least developed countries and other low-income countries, but, since in 1973 World
Bank president Robert McNamara emphasized the e¤ect of aid on poverty alleviation, the
share of total aid towards least developed countries has been expanding at the expense of
the share of aid towards other low-income countries.3
Interestingly, a strand of the theoretical literature has indicated that the foreign aid, if
it is disbursed by the need of the recipients, has an adverse e¤ect on the recipients
incentives to pursue good domestic policies. Svensson (2000b) argues that it is a moral
hazard problem that adversely a¤ects the recipientsincentive to undertake policy reforms.
In his moral hazard model, anticipating that aid will be allocated to the recipients in most
need, the recipient governments do not exert every e¤ort in improving the welfare of the
poor. Providing a game-theoretic rent-seeking model, Svensson (2000a) theoretically shows
that the foreign aid intensies rent-seeking activities and corruption among di¤erent
interest groups to appropriate the government revenue, thereby inducing the government to
reduce their productive public expenditure.4
2According to Easterly (2007), Pearson Commission (1969) presents this idea by saying IDA (Interna-
tional Development Association of the World Bank) has decided to make a special e¤ort to assist the poorest
members in project preparation so that they can benet more fully from IDA nancial assitance (p. 226).
Commission for Africa (2005), which echoes Pearson Commissions (1969) idea, proposes the improvements
of aid quality by allocating aid to countries where poverty is deepest and where aid can be best used (p. 99).
3Of course, the extent to which the distribution of foreign aid is directed towards the poorest countries
di¤ers across aid donors. Constructing aid concentration curves for monetary poverty, child malnutrition,
primary school enrollments, and under-ve mortality, Baulch (2006) examines whether aid is distributed
to the poorest countries. He nds that the United Kingdom and World Bank distribute around two-thirds
of their development assistance to the low income countries, whereas the United States and European
Commission spend the majority of their aid budgets in middle income countries.
4Reinikka and Svensson (2004) conrms how serious rent-seeking activities and corruption are in aid-
2
Rodrik (1996) also claims that foreign aid reduces the costs both of reform and of
doing nothing. As he says, foreign aid should help reforms get launched and sustained by
reducing these costs. When aid is disbursed by the needs of the recipients, that is, more aid
is directed towards poorer recipients, however, foreign aid also reduces the cost of doing
nothing and can also be considered as the benet of doing nothing or avoiding reforms by
compensating for these costs. What will happen if the cost of doing nothing or delaying
reforms is less than these benets? Needless to say, the recipient governments will have
little incentive to push through reforms, thereby worsening their welfare and getting more
aid. This is what the Kenyan government actually did in the early 1990s. Collier (1997)
points out that, in African countries where their policies have improved, the amount of aid
received has rather decreased, whereas most aid-increasing African countries have made
their policies worse.5
In this study, we theoretically examine if foreign aid discourage the recipients from
pursuing good policy reforms, when more aid is allocated to poorer recipients. In particular,
we focus on the adverse e¤ect of foreign aid on trade liberalization. The imposition of a
tari¤ has been considered to be a bad trade policy for a small open economy. In the partial
equilibrium approach of a small open economy, a tari¤ cannot improve the commodity
terms-of-trade but only causes deadweight loss by decreasing demand for imports and
reallocating resources to ine¢ cient production. Collier (2007) claims that high tari¤s in
poor countries protect their domestic rms from external competition, thereby making
recipient countries. Surveying primary school in Uganda, they nd that from 1991 to 1995 only 13% of
grant reached the primary schools, whereas most of the grant was captured by local o¢ cials and politicians.
Svensson (2000a) also provides interesting empirical evidence that foreign aid worsens corruption in countries
more likely to su¤er from competing social groups. Two recent empirical studies o¤er the conicting results
on the e¤ect of aid on corruption. Okada and Samreth (2012) investigate the e¤ect of aid on corruption in
120 developing countries using a quantile regression method and conclude that foreign aid reduces corruption
and its e¤ect is bigger in less corrupt countries. On the other hand, using the data from 52 African countries,
Asongu (2012) nds robust evidence that aid worsens corruption and points out that Okada and Samreths
(2012) nding may not be relevant for Africa.
5Dollar and Easterly (1999) introduce Zambia as an example showing that foreign aid is closely related to
bad policies. From 1970 through 1993 period, Zambia, although they were getting poorer, had bad policies
and delayed their reforms, whereas the amount of foreign aid owed into Zambia increased continuously,
thus reaching 11% of real GDP by the early 1990s.
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them less productive and shifting the cost of protection to domestic consumers.
There is abundant theoretical and empirical literature showing that trade liberalization
is growth-enhancing and poverty-alleviating in low-income aid recipients in the long run.
The innovation-based endogenous growth literature has theoretically shown that trade
openess generates technological progress, thereby speeding up productivity growth.6
Empirical evidence also broadly supports the link between trade liberalization and growth.
For example, Wacziarg and Welch (2008) reexamine Sachs and Warners (1995) study with
a new data over the 1950-98 period and nd that countries that liberalized their trade
regimes achieved about 1.5 percentage points higher average annual growth rates than
those before liberalization. Onafowora and Owoye (1998) nd empirical evidence that
economic growth in Sub-Saharan African countries is driven mainly by trade liberalization.
Surveying recent theoretical and empircal evidence of trade liberalization and poverty,
Winters et al. (2004) conclude that trade liberalization is, in principle, benecial for the
poor, even though its impact on poverty depends upon the environment in which it is
carried out.7 Unfortunately, however, Benedek et al. (2012) nd empirical evidence that
foreign aid impedes trade liberalization in aid-recipient countries. They examine how
foreign aid a¤ects a variety of tax revenues such as VAT, exercise tax, income tax and tari¤
revenues and nd that foreign aid increases only tari¤ revenues, whereas it decreases the
other tax revenues. One of the reasons for this may be higher tari¤s induced by foreign aid.
This paper is the rst to theoretically investigate whether foreign aid discourages trade
liberalization in aid-recipient countries. For this study, we develop a two-period general
equilibrium trade-theoretic model of an aid recipient country with a small open economy.
The general equilibrium trade-theorectic model is widely used and accepted in the literature
6See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a, b) for the link
between trade and growth.
7Winters et al. (2006) also point out that trade liberalization by its nature accompanies distributional
adjustments, and poorer households may be less able to protect themselves against the adverse e¤ects of
the adjustments. Hence, they emphasize that trade reform should be accompanied by complementary social
policies strengthening social protection for losers.
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of international trade and foreign aid theory.8 In our model, foreign aid is given to the
recipient country in period two and the amount of aid is negatively related to the level of
the period-one real income, which reects the fact that more aid is disbursed to poorer
recipients. The recipient country chooses optimally a tari¤ on imports, and may have
access to international borrowing in period one. It can also choose domestic investment
endogenously in period one, and this choice has an important bearing on our main nding.
We consider two variants of the model depending upon whether the recipient can or
cannot have access to international borrowing. Only when international borrowing is not
allowed and domestic investment is exogenous, optimal tari¤ is zero, which means that, in
this case, foreign aid does not discourage trade liberalization. When domestic investment is
chosen endogenously but international borrowing is still not allowed, we nd that foreign
aid discourages the recipient from pursuing trade liberalization because aid negatively
linked to the period-one real income induces positive optimal tari¤s. In the case with
international borrowing, even though domestic investment is exogenous, optimal tari¤ is
positive. However, it is not foreign aid but intertemporal terms of trade (interest rate) that
causes this positive tari¤. Finally, when, in addition, domestic investment is endogenous,
the tying of aid to the period-one real income increases optimal tari¤s further. We also nd
that aid-induced positive optimal tari¤s are higher in poorer countries in period one.
This study is closely related to two strands of literature. Djaji´c et al. (1999, 2004)
incorporate an intertemporal optimization problem into the traditional static model of
international trade and foreign aid and thus, in their intertemporal framework, aid a¤ects
welfare not only via the international terms-of-trade of commodity but also via domestic
savings and investment. In the same fashion as Djaji´c et al. (1999, 2004), our
intertemporal model allows the recipient country to choose domestic investment
endogenously in period one. In reality, endogenous domestic investment represents that it is
market-determined, whereas exogenous domestic investment is considered to be xed or
8See, for example, Dixit and Norman, 1980; Bhagwati et al., 1985; Lahiri et al., 2002
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regulated by government. Our study adds value to Djaji´c et al. (1999, 2004) by also
allowing international borrowing to be endogenously chosen, while they assume the absense
of international borrowing. Also, our study focuses on the role of foreign aid in the e¤ect of
a tari¤ on welfare, whereas Djaji´c et al. (1999, 2004) examines the e¤ect of foreign aid on
welfare. The main idea of this paper comes from the the other strand of literature, for
example, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1995, 1997a, 1997b) and Lahiri et al. (2002), that
focuses on the optimal tari¤ in aid-recipient countries. In this study, therefore, we develop
a theoretical model which incorporates two strands of literature in order to examine
whether foreign aid discourages trade liberalization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the theoretical model
is developed. In section 3, we commit the comparative statics to answer our main question.
In particular, section 3 is divided into two subsections according by whether international
borrowing is allowed. Section 4 makes some concluding remarks.
1.2 THE THEORETICAL MODEL
We consider a two-period general equilibrium trade-theoretic model of a small open
economy. In the model, a poor country participates in international trade and receives
foreign aid from the world. Without any loss of generality, we assume that the aid-recipient
country is an exporter of the numeraire good and an importer of the non-numeraire good
by the principle of comparative advantage. Foreign aid, T , is given to the recipient country
in the second period. In order to reect the distribution of aid towards the poorest
countries, the amount of foreign aid received in period two is assumed to be negatively
related to the recipients real income in period one, U1. Mathematically, it is assumed that
T is decreasing in U1 at decreasing rate, that is, T
0
< 0 and T
00
> 0. The recipient country
also invests in period one, augmenting its capital stock in period two. The domestic
investment in period one can be chosen endogenously. Capital stock is assumed to be
accumulated in the form of the numeraire good. The recipient country chooses optimally a
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tari¤,  , on imports in period one, and may have access to international borrowing in
period one. The amount of international borrowing, B, is determined by the optimal
borrowing decision in period one, and the whole amount of principal and interest is repaid
in period two. In this model, relative import price, P , is given exogenously because the
recipient country is a small open economy so that its import policies cannot a¤ect world
prices and the imposition of a tari¤ cannot improve the terms-of-trade of commodity. In
contrast, the recipients international borrowing can a¤ect world interest rate, and an
increase in world interest rate worsens the terms-of-trade of international borrowing.
Assuming that tari¤ revenue and foreign aid are distributed to the consumers in the
recipient in a lump-sum fashion, the general equilibrium conditions in the recipient country
are given by (1) for the rst period and (2) for the second period as:
E1(1; P 1 +  ; U1) + I = R1(1; P 1 +  ;K1) + (E12  R12) +B; (1)
E2(1; P 2; U2) = R2(1; P 2; K1 + I) + T (U1)  (1 + r)B; (2)
where the superscripts 1 and 2 represent the period one and period two, respectively, E()
and R() are the expenditure and revenue functions, respectively, P is the relative price of
the non-numeraire good when the price of the numeraire good is normalized to one, U is
the utility or real income, K is the capital stock, I is the amount of investment in period
one, T is the foreign aid tranferred from the world to the recipient country in period two,
B is the amount of international borrowing in period one,  is the tari¤ on the
non-numeraire good in period one, r is the international interest rate, and E12 and R
1
2 are
the partial derivatives of E1and R1 with respect to P 1 +  .
From the standard properties of duality theory in microeconomics, E12 is the
compensated demand function for the non-numeraire good and R12 is the supply function of
the non-numeraire good. Therefore, E12  R12 is the excess demand for the non-numeraire
good (or import demand) and (E12  R12) represents the tari¤ revenue of the recipient
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government from importing the non-numeraire good from the world. Equation (1) and (2)
represent the budget constraints in the rst period and the second period, respectively, for
the representative consumer in the recipient country. In the equilibrium of the rst period,
the sum of consumption expenditure, E1, paid for achieving U1 at P 1 +  and investment
expenditure, I , should be equal to the sum of revenue, R1, generated from production
using the factor K1 at P 1 +  , tari¤ revenue, (E12  R12), and international borrowing, B.
In the second period equilibrium, the sum of consumption expenditure, E2, paid for
achieving U2 at P 2 should be equal to the sum of revenue, R2, generated from production
using the factor K1 + I at P 2, foreign aid, T (U1), and reimbursement of international
borrowing,  (1 + r)B.9
The intertemporal welfare function of the representative consumer in the recipient
country is time separable and takes the following simple form:
W (U1; U2) = U1 +
1
1 + 
U2; (3)
where  is the constant rate of time preference in the recipient country. If domestic
investment is taken to be endogenous, the representative consumer in the recipient country
chooses the optimal quantity of investment to maximize his/her lifetime utility W (U1; U2)
in period one. By setting @W=@I = 0 as the rst order condition, the optimal investment
condition is obtained as:
(1 + )E23 = R
2
3E
1
3 ; (4)
where E13 and E
2
3 are the reciprocals of marginal utility of income in the rst and second
period, respectively, and R23 is the marginal revenue of capital in the second period, also
representing the shadow price of capital in the second period. The left hand side is the
marginal benet of investment, that is, the welfare gain from the investment-induced
9The other production factors except capital stock are assumed to be unchanged through two periods
and thus are omitted from the revenue function without any loss of generality. Also, the scrap value of
capital stock at the end of the second period is assumed to be zero due to total depreciation.
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increase in the second period consumption by allocating the marginal unit of the numeraire
good to investment rather than consumption, whereas the right hand side is the marginal
cost of investment, namely, the welfare loss from lower consumption in period one. Given
any price level, E1and E2 are clearly increasing in U1and U2, meaning that E13 > 0 and
E23 > 0 and, by the law of diminishing marginal utility of income, E
1
33 > 0 and E
2
33 > 0.
Then, from these properties and the rst order condition,
@(@W=@I)=@I =  [E133E23 + (1 + )E233E13 ]=(E13)3E23 < 0. Therefore, the second order
condition is satised and guarantees that the optimal investment yields a maximum of the
welfare function. In this model, endogenous investment means that the quantity of
investment is market-determined and thus varies with changing market conditions, in
particular, occurred by the imposition of a tari¤.
The quantity of international borrowing, B, is also optimally chosen by the
representative consumer in the recipient country in period one. By setting @W=@B = 0, we
can get the optimal borrowing condition as:
(1 + )E23 = (1 + r)E
1
3 : (5)
The marginal cost of international borrowing on the left hand side is the period-two welfare
loss from less consumption incurred by reimbursements, while the marginal benet on the
right hand side represents the period-one welfare gain caused by more consumption and
investment. Also, that @(@W=@B)=@B =  [E133E23 + (1 + )E233E13 ]=(E13)3E23 < 0 gives us a
su¢ cient condition for a maximum of welfare.
A system of ve equations from (1) to (5) can be solved for the ve endogenous
variables (U1, U2, I, r and W ) as functions of two exogenous variables ( and B). In the
ve-equation system, the optimal quantity of international borrowing, B, is taken to be an
exogenous variable and a¤ects interest rate, r. This enables us to pay attention to the
terms-of-trade of international borrowing, that is, interest rate. After solving the model
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above, we perform comparative static analyses to examine (i) how total welfare responds to
a change in a tari¤ in an equilibrium, (ii) whether zero tari¤ is optimal for the recipient
country, and (iii) how foreign aid a¤ects the optimum tari¤ decision in the recipient
country. We consider two variants of the model depending upon whether the recipient
country can or cannot borrow from the international capital markets.
1.3 THE COMPARATIVE STATICS
Totally di¤erentiating (1) and (2), using (4) and (5), we get
dU1 =
@U1
@
d +
@U1
@B
dB +
@U1
@I
dI; (6)
dU2 =
@U2
@
d +
@U2
@B
dB +
@U2
@I
dI +
@U2
@r
dr; (7)
where
@U1
@
=
(E122  R122)
E13   E123
< 0;
@U1
@B
=
1
E13   E123
> 0;
@U1
@I
=   1
E13   E123
< 0;
@U2
@
=
(E122  R122)
(E13   E123)E23
T 0 > 0;
@U2
@B
=  1 + 
E13
+
1
(E13   E123)E23
T 0 < 0;
@U2
@I
=
1 + 
E13
  1
(E13   E123)E23
T 0 > 0 and
@U2
@r
=   B
E23
< 0;
where T 0 is the negative partial derivative of T with respect to U1, E122 is the slope of the
compensated demand curve for the non-numeraire good in period one, R122 is the slope of
the supply curve of the non-numeraire good in period one, and E123 is the partial derivative
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of the compensated demand for the non-numeraire good with respect to U1 in period one.
We know that E122 < 0 and R
1
22 > 0. Thus, the slope of the excess demand for the
non-numeraire good in period one is also negative, that is, E122  R122 < 0. Now both the
numeraire good and non-numeraire good are assumed to be normal goods. Then the
"Hatta normality condition" (see, Hatta, 1977) is also assumed to be satised, which
means that E13   E123 = E13 [1  (E123=E13)] = E13(1  C1Y ) > 0.10
Totally di¤erentiating (4) and (5), and substituting (6) and (7) for dU1 and dU2, we
get dI and dr as functions of two exogenous variables,  and B, as:
dI =
@I
@
d +
@I
@B
dB; (8)
dr =
@r
@
d +
@r
@B
dB; (9)
where
@I
@
=
1



 (1 + )E
2
3E
1
33(E
1
22  R122)
(E13)
2R233(E
1
3   E123)
  (1 + )E
2
3E
1
32
(E13)
2R233
+
(1 + )E233(E
1
22  R122)
E13R
2
33(E
1
3   E123)E23
T 0

;
@I
@B
=
1



  (1 + )E
2
3E
1
33
(E13)
2R233(E
1
3   E123)
  (1 + )
2E233
(E13)
2R233
+
(1 + )E233
E13R
2
33(E
1
3   E123)E23
T 0

> 0;
@r
@
=
1



 (1 + )E
2
3E
1
33(E
1
22  R122)
(E13)
2(E13   E123)
  (1 + )E
2
3E
1
32
(E13)
2
+
(1 + )E233(E
1
22  R122)
E13(E
1
3   E123)E23
T 0

and
@r
@B
=
1



  (1 + )E
2
3E
1
33
(E13)
2(E13   E123)
  (1 + )
2E233
(E13)
2
+
(1 + )E233
E13(E
1
3   E123)E23
T 0

< 0;
where

 = 1  (1 + )E
2
3E
1
33
(E13)
2R233(E
1
3   E123)
  (1 + )
2E233
(E13)
2R233
+
(1 + )BE233
E13E
2
3
+
(1 + )E233
E13R
2
33(E
1
3   E123)E23
T 0 > 0; 11
and R233 represents the decreasing shadow price of capital (or investment) in the second
10The term C1Y = E
1
23=E
1
3 is the pure income e¤ect of the Slutsky equation in terms of the expenditure
function in period one representing how Marshallian (uncompensated) demand responds to changes in real
income in period one. Given any level of  , (P 1 + )C1Y is the period-one marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) on the non-numeraire good in the recipient country.
11For convenience, we simply treat 
 just as a positive constant from now on.
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period. Since R233 < 0, it follows that unambiguously 
 > 0, @I=@B > 0 and @r=@B < 0.
In particular, the negative partial e¤ect of B on r corresponds to the Walrasian stable
condition for the international borrowing market.
Totally di¤erentiating (3) and using (6)-(9), we obtain the e¤ects of a tari¤ change on
intertemporal welfare as:
dW
d
=
dU1
d
+
1
1 + 
dU2
d
(10)
=

@U1
@
+
1
1 + 
@U2
@

(11)
+

@U1
@I
+
1
1 + 
@U2
@I

@I
@
(12)
+
1
1 + 
@U2
@r
@r
@
: (13)
In (10), there are three distinct e¤ects of a tari¤ change on intertemporal welfare: (i) the
intertemporal direct income e¤ect, (ii) the intertemporal indirect income e¤ect via
investment, and (iii) the period-two indirect income e¤ect via interest rate.
The intertermporal direct income e¤ect is shown in (11) and consists of two conicting
terms. The rst term in (11), the period-one direct income e¤ect, is negative. This
represents that a tari¤ increase causes deadweight loss in period one incurred by reducing
import demands for the non-numeraire good and increasing its ine¤cient dometic
production. In contrast, the second term in (11), which is the period-two direct income
e¤ect, is positive because foreign aid negatively tied to the period-one real income
compensates for the period-one welfare loss from the tari¤ increase.
The intertemporal indirect income e¤ect via investment, shown in (12), is the sum of
two conicting e¤ects. Two partial e¤ects of investment on intertemporal welfare are of
opposite sign because they are the marginal cost of investment in period one and the
marginal benet of investment in period two, respectively. The partial e¤ect of a tari¤ on
investment in period one is ambiguous. A tari¤ increase yields more tari¤ revenue, thereby
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encouraging more investment in period one. On the contrary, the tari¤ increase can
discourage investment in period one in two indirect ways: it causes welfare loss in period
one; and this period-one welfare loss invites more aid in period two, thereby reducing
investment.
In (13), the indirect income e¤ect via interest rate exists only in period two and is also
ambiguous. The partial e¤ect of interest rate on the period-two income is obviously
negative because an increase in interest rate worsens the terms-of-trade of international
borrowing. But, the partial e¤ect of a tari¤ on interest rate is unclear. An increase in tari¤
revenue decreases demand for international borrowing, thereby lowering interest rates. In
contrast, a tari¤ increase raises interest rates in two indirect ways: it causes welfare loss in
period one, thus stimulating demand for international borrowing; and larger inows of aid
in period two induce to borrow more in period one.
1.3.1 The case without International Borrowing (B = 0)
1.3.1.1 Exogenous Domestic Investment
We now analyze the case when there is no international borrowing (B = 0), that is,
the recipient country cannot have access to international credit markets. When B = 0, the
terms-of-trade of international borrowing does not a¤ect intertemporal welfare. Hence, the
period-two indirect income e¤ect via interest rate, (13), disappears. Also, domestic
investment is not a¤ected by a tari¤ change because it is exogeously given. Therefore, the
investment-induced indirect income e¤ect, (12), also does not exist. Therefore, ceteris
paribus, we obtain dW=d only as the same as the intertemporal direct income e¤ect of a
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tari¤ in (11):
dW
d
=
@U1
@
+
1
1 + 
@U2
@
=
(E122  R122)
E13   E123
+
1
1 + 
(E122  R122)T 0
(E13   E123)E23
=
(E122  R122)
E13   E123

1 +
1
1 + 
T 0
E23

: (14)
Also, the second-order derivative of W with respect to  is obtained as:
d2W
d 2
=
E122  R122
E13   E123

1  
2(E122  R122)E133
(E13   E123)2

1 +
1
1 + 
T 0
E23

+

(E122  R122)
E13   E123
2
1
(1 + )E23
h
T
00   (1 + )2E233
i
: (15)
In (14), the period-one direct income e¤ect has a negative sign because of the deadweight
loss from imposing a tari¤ in period one. In contrast, the positive period-two direct income
e¤ect indicates that foreign aid negatively related to the period-one real income improves
the period-two real income. Therefore, the intertemporal direct income e¤ect of a tari¤
depends upon which one of two conicting e¤ects dominates.
In (14), we dene a negative term, , as follows:
 =
1
1 + 
@U2=@
@U1=@
=
1
1 + 
T
0
E23
< 0; (16)
where the absolute value of  represents the extent to which foreign aid in period two
compensates for the period-one welfare loss from the impostion of a tari¤. From now on,
we make an assumption that the negative term, , is greater than negative one. This
assumption implies that the period-one welfare loss from a positive tari¤ is more than
o¤set by foreign aid in period two. It makes sense because, as mentioned in the rst
footnote, foreign aid is not determined only by the needs of the recipients but also by the
donorspolitical and strategic considerations. If foreign aid is disbursed only by the needs
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of the recipients, the period-one welfare loss incurred by a positive tari¤ would be exactly
o¤set by foreign aid given in period two at any  , and thus  would be negative one.
Technically speaking, if  is negative one, the rst-order condition would be fullled at any
 and thus there would be no signicant choice to be made regarding the optimal  for the
maximization of W . Thus, any positve tari¤ is neither benecial nor detrimental to the
recipient country. If  is less than negative one, W would be strictly increasing in  at a
incresing rate, and thus there is no nite maximum if the set of nonnegative real numbers
is taken to be its domain. Thus, our assumption also enables us to properly rule out the
case when  is equal to or less than negative one. This assumption is formally expressed as
 1 <  = 1
1 + 
T
0
E23
< 0: (17)
Assumption 1 simply implies that (14) always has a negative value because the
negative e¤ect in period one dominates. We add another assumption to the model. We
assume that  becomes closer to zero as  increases. This assumption reects that aid is
conditional upon trade liberalization in recipient countries. In other words, this assumption
means that higher tari¤ rates make the absolute value of  lower because donor countries
are more reluctant to provide aid to recipient coutries with higher tari¤s. This assumption
takes the following form:
@
@
=
1
1 + 
(E122  R122)
(E13   E123)E23
"
T
00  

T
0
E23
2
E233
#
> 0. (18)
Under Assumption 1 and 2, the rst-order condition of W for relative extremum in
(14) is satised at  = 0, and d2W=d 2 < 0 in (15)12, meaning that the function W is
strictly concave. Therefore, zero tari¤ is optimal and the stationary value of W at  = 0 is
the unique global maximum. In this case, foreign aid does not discourage trade
12From Assumption 1, we obtain

T
0
E23
2
< (1 + )2. When we substitute (1 + )2 for

T
0
E23
2
, we obtain
the condition T
00   (1 + )2E233 < 0. This condition guarantees that d2W=d2 < 0.
15
liberalization. A positive tari¤ has only a negative e¤ect on the recipients intertemporal
welfare, because the marginal cost of a tari¤ increase from zero is greater than the
marginal benet.
1.3.1.2 Endogenous Domestic Investment
We now turn to the case when domestic investment is endogenously chosen. In this
case, the e¤ect of a tari¤ change on intertemporal welfare is the sum of the intertemporal
direct income e¤ect and the investment-induced intertemporal indirect income e¤ect.
Ceteris paribus, the term dW=d can be simplied and reorganized as:


dW
d
= 


@U1
@
+
1
1 + 
@U2
@

+

@U1
@I
+
1
1 + 
@U2
@I

@I
@

= 

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E13   E123

1 +
1
1 + 
T 0
E23

+ 

+T 0; (19)
where
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2
3E
1
33(E
1
22  R122)
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E123)
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(1 + )E23E
1
23E
1
32
(E13)
3R233(E
1
3   E123)
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2E233(E
1
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(E13)
2R233(E
1
3   E123)
< 0 and
 =
E132
(E13)
2R233(E
1
3   E123)
< 0:13
Also, the second derivative of W with respect to  is obtained as:


d2W
d 2
=

E122  R122
E13   E123

1 +
1
1 + 
T 0
E23

+ 

+
(E122  R122)
E13   E123

1  
2(E122  R122)E133
(E13   E123)2

1 +
1
1 + 
T 0
E23

+

(E122  R122)
E13   E123
2
1
(1 + )E23
h
T
00   (1 + )2E233
i
+
(E122  R122)
E13   E123
T
00
: (20)
13For convenience, we treat  and  as constants.
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On the right hand side of (20), only the last term is positive while the other terms are
negative. Assuming that the last term is negligible, the second order condition is satised,
which gives us a su¢ cient condition for the unique global maximum of W .
Setting (19) equal to zero as the rst-order condition, we obtain a positive optimal
tari¤
  =
 T 0
E122 R122
E13 E123

1 + 1
1+
T 0
E23

+ 
> 0: (21)
The stationary value of W at the postive optimal tari¤   is the global maximum of W . In
addition, when (19) and (20) are evaluated at  = 0, the rst and second derivatives of W
with respect to  are obtained as:


dW
d
j=0 = T 0 > 0 and (22)


d2W
d 2
j=0 = E
1
22  R122
E13

1 +
1
1 + 
T 0
E23

+  < 0: (23)
In (22) and (23), W is increasing in  at a decreasing rate at  = 0, which also shows that
optimal tari¤ is not zero but positive.
Interestingly, if T 0 = 0 in (19)(22), then optimal tari¤ is zero and it guarantees the
unique global maximum of W . This obviously suggests that, when domestic investment is
endogenous, the positive optimal tari¤ is induced by foreign aid which is negatively tied to
period-one income. In this case, therefore, foreign aid does discourage trade liberalization.
In (22) and (23), a tari¤ increase from zero leads to more investment in period one, thereby
generating the period-two welfare gain. Of course, the cost of a tari¤ increase is the welfare
loss in period one from more investment and less consumption. But the tying of foreign aid
to the period-one income partly compensates for the period-one welfare loss. At a zero
tari¤, therefore, the marginal benet of a tari¤ increase is greater than its marginal cost.
The recipient country increases its tari¤ up until the marginal cost of a tari¤ increase
becomes equal to the marginal benet. Therefore, the recipient country has an incentive to
17
impose a positive tari¤ to increase investment in period one. If foreign aid is not negatively
related to the period-one real income, that is, T 0 = 0, then the period-one welfare loss from
a tari¤ increase from zero would always be more than o¤set by the period-two welfare gain,
and thus the recipient would not be willing to raise its tari¤ from zero.
1.3.2 The case with international borrowing (B > 0)
1.3.2.1 Exogenous Domestic Investment
We consider the case when the recipient country can borrow from the international
credit markets (B > 0). Intertemporal welfare is a¤ected not only directly by a tari¤
change but also indirectly by a change in the terms-of-trade of international borrowing.
When domestic investment is exogenous, we obtain dW=d as:
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B: (24)
Unfortunately, (24) is not easy to be solved for the optimal  since it is a quadratic form in
the variable  . But we can basically check out if the optimal tari¤ is zero or not by
evaluating the rst and second derivatives of W with respect to  at  = 0. Using (24), we
obtain the rst and second order condition evaluated at  = 0 as:


dW
d
j=0 = E
1
32B
(E13)
2
> 0 and (25)
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In (25) and (26), the rst-order condition for relative extremum is not satised at  = 0,
and W is increasing in  at a decreasing rate at  = 0. Therefore, it is revealed that
optimal tari¤ is not zero but positive. We can also know that, when B = 0, zero tari¤
guarantees the unique global maximum of W . Hence, the positive optimal tari¤ in this case
is not caused by foreign aid negatively tied to period-one real income but caused by the
terms-of-trade of international borrowing, that is, interest rate. The imposition of a
positive tari¤ causes the period-one welfare loss from less consumption but yields tari¤
revenue in period one. The tari¤ revenue decreases the demand for international
borrowing, thereby improving the term-of-trade of international borrowing in period two.
Obviously, this improvement reduces the burden of reinbursement in period two, thereby
making the recipient country better o¤ in period two. At a zero tari¤, the marginal benet
of a tari¤ increase from zero is greater than its marginal cost. The recipient country
increases it tari¤ up until the marginal cost of a tari¤ becomes equal to the marginal
benet. In this case, foreign aid does not discourage trade liberalization.
1.3.2.2 Endogenous Domestic Investment
In the case when, in addition, domestic investment is endogenous, the expression
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dW=d is obtained as the sum of all three distinct e¤ects:
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Also, the second derivative of W with respect to  is obtained as:
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In (28), the function W is strictly concave, which means that the stationary value of W at
a critical value  is the unique global maximum.
Setting (27) equal to zero, the positive optimal tari¤ is obtained as:
  =
 (T 0 +	B)
E122 R122
E13 E123

1 + 1
1+
T 0
E23

+ + B
> 0: (29)
This positive optimal tari¤ guarantees the unique global maximum of W . Also evaluating
14For convenience, we treat  and 	 as negative constants.
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(27) and (28) at  = 0, we obtain


dW
d
j=0 = T 0 +	B > 0 and (30)
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In (30) and (31), W is increasing in  at a decreasing rate at  = 0, which makes sure that
zero tari¤ is no longer optimal. The positive optimal tari¤ is induced not only by the
endogenous terms-of-trade of international borrowing but also by foreign aid negatively
tied to the period-one income.
In this case, foreign aid discourages trade liberalization. There are two benecial
e¤ects of a tari¤ increase from zero on the intertemporal welfare: a positive tari¤ allows
the recipient country to invest more in period one, thereby increasing the period-two
consumption; and it also improves the terms-of-trade of international borrowing, thereby
making the recipient country repay its external debt less in period two. The cost of a tari¤
increase from zero is the period-one real income loss from less consumption. But this cost
is in part o¤set by foreign aid given in period two. At a zero tari¤, the marginal benet of
a tari¤ increase is greater than its marginal cost. A positive tari¤ continues to increase
until the marginal cost becomes equal to the marginal benet. In this case, if foreign aid is
not tied to the period-one real income, that is, T 0 = 0, optimal tari¤ is still positive
because of the benecial e¤ect of a positive tari¤ on the terms-of-trade of international
borrowing. But the tying of foreign aid to the period-one income increases its positive
optimal tari¤ further.
1.4 CONCLUSION
This study theoretically examines if foreign aid discourages aid-recipient countries
from pursuing trade liberalization policies, when more aid is disbursed to poorer countries,
using a two-period general equilibrium trade-theoretic model of a small open economy. In
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the traditional static model of international transfer of income, the commodity
terms-of-trade is the main mechanism of an exogenous change for a¤ecting welfare. But
our intertemporal model has the virtue of allowing us to consider endogenous investment as
another channel through which a¤ects intertemporal welfare, which is closely linked to our
key ndings. Also, we consider international borrowing in our intertemporal settting, even
though it has been usually ignored in the traditional static model. This enables us to nd
that endogenous term-of-trade of international borrowing in a small open economy, that is,
interest rate, also plays an important role in intertemporal welfare in aid-recipient
countries.
We investigate whether the tying of foreign aid in period two negatively to the
period-one real income inuences the imposition of a positive optimal tari¤ in the recipient
country. Two variants of the model are considered depending upon whether there is
international borrowing or not. We nd that optimal tari¤ is zero only when the recipient
country cannot borrow from the world and domestic investment is exogenously given. In
this case, foreign aid does not discourage trade liberalization. In the other cases, in
contrast, optimal tari¤ is positive. When there is international borrowing but investment is
exogenous, the reason for the positive optimal tari¤ is not the tying of aid negatively to the
period-one real income but the benecial e¤ect of a positive tari¤ on the improvement in
the terms-of-trade of international borrowing. Most importantly, when domestic
investment is endogenous, foreign aid negatively linked to the period-one real income
induces a positive optimal tari¤. In this case, the reason for the positive optimal tari¤ is
that foreign aid in period two partly compensates for the period-one real income loss and
this enables the recipient country to invest more in period one. We also nd that
aid-induced positive optimal tari¤ gets higher as the recipient gets poorer in period one.
Intuitively, when domestic investment is endogenous, that is, it is market-determined,
foreign aid discourages trade liberalization in aid-recipient countries. As the benet of not
pursuing trade liberalization, foreign aid enables the recipients to impose its optimal
22
positive tai¤ so as to invest more in period one.
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CHAPTER 2
HEALTH POLICIES AND THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF HEALTH AID: A
THEORY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Let hunger be ranked rst, because if you are hungry, you cannot work! No, health is
number one, because if you are ill, you cannot work! Discussion Group, Musanya Village,
Zambia (WHO & World Bank, 2002)
There is little doubt about the magnitude of good health in low income countries.
Good health is a determinant of economic growth and a component of the well-being of the
population. Illness can reduce household savings, lower learning ability, reduce
productivity and lead to a low quality of life, thereby creating or perpetuating poverty.
Thus, ill health in low income countries does not only represents the humanitarian tragedy
but also puts a drag on economic growth. The Millennium Summit of the United Nations
in 2000 established total eight international development goals, which is also called the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and ve out of the eight goals are the
health-related goals.15 Children are more vulnerable than adults to illness. Poor families, if
their children get sick, often lose their precious income and assets to pay for their sick
childrens medical costs, thereby impoverishing them even further and exacerbating the
vicious circle of poverty and ill health. Therefore, Millennium Development Goal 4 (MDG
4) calls for reducing the under-ve mortality rate by two thirds between 1990 and 2015.
The world has made substantial progress, thereby reducing the under-ve mortality rate 47
percent from 1990 to 2012. But still, in 2012, approximately 6.6 million children worldwide
15The representative health indicators for the health-related MDGs are as follows: underweight prevalence
of under-5 children (MDG 1: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger), under-5 mortality rate (MDG 4:
to reduce child mortality rates), maternal mortality ratio (MDG 5: to improve maternal health), AIDS
prevalence, use of insecticide-treated bed nets (MDG 6: to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases),
use of improved water source, and use of improved sanitation facilities (MDG 7: to ensure environmental
sustainability)
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18,000 children per day died before reaching their fth birthday, mostly from
preventable causes and treatable diseases (UN-IGME, 2013).
Nevertheless, the stark imbalances of health care provision between rich and poor
countries have been reported. As of 2009, low-income developing countries have 92% of the
global disease burden, whereas they account for only 16% of global health spending (Moon
and Omole, 2013). Therefore, the international community has paid attention to health
challenges in developing countries. The past decade has witnessed extraordinary growth of
international nancing in global health and a compelling move of foreign aid from nancing
physical infrastructure to improving public health.16 The logic behind this move is that if
people are healthier, then they will work better and longer, thus achieving sustainable
economic growth. In reality, development assistance for health has increased from US $5.7
billion in 1990 to a record-high of US $28.2 billion in 2010 (IHME, 2012). Approximately
10% of Africas health care spending is nanced by foreign aid (IFC, 2007). As a result, it
is widely accepted that foreign aid for health works relatively better than for other
sectors.17 For example, Levines surveys (2004, 2007) on successful cases in public health in
the developing world show how health aid made a contribution to their success. Keeping
pace with health aids tangible success, foreign aid has undergone a considerable change
both in the quantities given and in the way it is spent.
The remarkable increases in health aid over the past years have made examining the
e¤ectiveness of health aid all the more important. It is the optimal allocation of health aid
that ensure health aid e¤ectiveness in the aggregate. There are two di¤erent perspective on
16Traditionally, foreign aid has been justed by lling the gap between the amount of investment necessary
to achieve a certain level of economic growth and the available domestic saving (Chenery and Strout, 1966).
However, Empirical evidence has not favored the link from aid to growth via investment. Boone (1996)
claims that aid has been used to increase consumption rather than investment. Easterly (2001) tests both
whether foreign aid has increased investment and whether investment has increased economic growth. But
he nds no evidence that foreign aid has nanced the gap e¤ectively. Actually, the voluminous literature
has attempted to examine the aid-growth relationship using a variety of methods and frameworks. Yet, it
does not provide robust evidence of either positive or negative relationship between them.
17The empirical literature, however, have not reached a robust consensus on the positive e¤ect of health
aid on public health outcomes. For the details, see Williamson (2008), Mishra and Newhouse (2009) and
Wilson (2011).
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the optimal allocation of health aid. The rst one is a macro perspective on whether
relatively more health aid goes to countries with lower levels of public health. On the other
hand, the second one is a micro perspective on whether health aid in a recipient country is
allocated in a way that helps the poor e¤ectively. This study provides a theoretical
explanation for the latter one. Our theoretical model takes heterogeneity within health aid
into account. In other words, we argue that various types of health aid are given to a
recipient country on their own purposes and thus their e¤ectiveness varies considerably in
quality. For example, some of them are used to raise the quality of health care (e.g. health
aid for basic health infrastructure), while others are given to provide preventive care (e.g.
health aid for basic nutrition) or to reduce the cost of health care (e.g. heath aid for supply
of basic health care). Among them, there are types of health aid that work better than the
others.
In this study, we develop a microeconomics model addressing two issues. The rst
issue is the e¤ectiveness of health policies in the context of the poor households utility
maximization. What will happen to poor households if their children get sick? Poverty
denies sick children access to reliable health services and a¤ordable medicines. The costs of
health care are too high for poor parents to take their sick children to health care
providers. Also, not all sick children taken to hospitals are guaranteed to survive, because
of the bad quality of medical services. One of the feasible ways to improve childrens health
is to provide them with relevant preventive care. It can be e¤ective in preventing children
from getting severe illness. But it does not guarantee severely sick children to survive. In
the model, therefore, poor households have no choice but to choose the optimal number of
their sick children taken to hospitals to maximize their lifetime utility, given their
intertemporal budget constraints. There are three policy options that policymakers use to
improve public health: raising the quality of health care, providing preventive care and
reducing the costs of health care. We show how these three policy options inuence the
optimal number of sick children who are medically treated.
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The second issue relates to the optimal allocation of health aid supporting the poor
households utility maximization in a poor country. The countrys health authority
maximizes the representive households lifetime utility by allocating health aid for the three
policy options. We nd that allocating more health aid for reducing the cost of health care
is the most e¤ective way to maximize each poor households lifetime utility. The main idea
of this study comes from Lahiri and Self (2008) where they examine gender bias problem in
health care provision. For this study, we use a similar theoretical framework as Lahiri and
Selfs (2008) but focus on the optimal allocation of health aid.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In section 2, we present a theoretical
model of the e¤ectiveness of public health policies. Section 2 is divided into two parts. The
rst part deals with the each poor households utility maximization to choose the optimal
number of sick children who are medically treated. In the other part, we theoretically
examine how three policy options inuence the optimal number of sick children taken to
hospitals. In section 3, we theoretically nd the health authoritys optimal allocation of
health aid in order to maximize each households lifetime utility. Section 4 concludes and
draws policy implications.
2.2 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HEALTH POLICIES
2.2.1 The Households Utility Maximization
People live for only two periods in a poor country. In period one, when people are
children, some of them become sick. Each household has N childrens. The proportion of
the sick children, i, is known to the families. Thus, total Ni children are sick in each
household. Part of the sick children is severe. But there is uncertainty of how many sick
children are severe. Assume that the number of children who are severely sick is a random
variable X and it follows the binomial distribution with the probability that a child is
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severely sick, p, denoted by
Pr(X = x) =

Ni
x

px(1  p)Ni x; p 2 (0; 1); (32)
where p is an index of the provision of preventive care. Thus, the more provides the
preventive care, the lower becomes the likelihood of severely sickness, p. Severely sick
children die unless they dont receive health care treatment.
A household takes q proportion of sick children randomly to health care providers.
Thus, qNi children receive the medical treatment. Among qNi children who receive the
medical treatment, severely sick qX children are in need of the medical treatment to
survive, whereas q(Ni X) children dont have to receive the medical treatment to survive
since they are not severely ill. The medical treatment from health care providers costs the
family the xed positive amount of c per child. A proportion of  among qX children do
not survive although they receive the medical treatment. In this context,  represents the
quality of health care. The higher becomes the quality of health care, the lower goes .
Severely sick children who dont receive the medical treatment, (1  q)X, also die. Thus,
the number of children who die, D, is
D = qX + (1  q)X = (q + 1  q)X; q + 1  q 2 (; 1) (33)
where q + 1  q is the probability that severely sick children die. We also know that
@D
@q
=  (1  )X < 0 (34)
for  2 (0; 1). That is, the more sick children taken to hospitals, the less sick children who
die of their disease.
The children who do not die become adults and earn wage w in the second period.
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Thus, a households net total income in terms of the period-two price, y, is
y = w(N  D)  (1 + r)cqNi
= wN   w(q + 1  q)X   (1 + r)cqNi (35)
where r is a discount factor. The net utility of the household, u, is
u = U(y   D); u0 > 0; u00 < 0; (36)
where  is a constant parameter representing marginal disutility from bereavement and
thus D denotes disutility from bereavement of childrensdeaths. We use the concept of
certainty equivalence to treat uncertainty. According to the Markowitzs (1952) model of
mean-variance analysis of portfolio selection, the certainty equivalence of the households
utility, uc, is written as
uc = E(y   D)  var(y   D); (37)
where  is the measure of relative risk preference. We assume that the economic agents are
risk averse, which means that  > 0:
Again, the number of severely sick children, X, is assumed to follow a binomial
distribution. Thus, the expected value and variance of X can be written as
E(X) = Nip; (38)
V ar(X) = Nip(1  p): (39)
From (33) and (35),
y   D = wN   (q + 1  q)(w + )X   (1 + r)cqNi: (40)
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Therefore, using (38) and (39), we get the expected value and variance of y   D as:
E(y   D) = wN   (q + 1  q)(w + )Nip  (1 + r)cqNi; (41)
V ar(y   D) = (q + 1  q)2(w + )2Nip(1  p): (42)
Substituting (41) and (42) into (37), we also get
uc = E(y   D)  var(y   D)
= wN   (q + 1  q)(w + )Nip  (1 + r)cqNi
 (q + 1  q)2(w + )2Nip(1  p): (43)
Each household chooses the optimal q by maximizing uc with respect to q. Taking a
partial derivative of (43) with respect to q, we obtain the rst order condition as
@uc
@q
= (1  )(w+)Nip  (1+ r)cNi+2(1  )(q+1  q)(w+)2Nip(1  p) = 0; (44)
which can be simplied as
(1  )(w + )p+ 2(1  )(q + 1  q)(w + )2p(1  p) = (1 + r)c: (45)
Also, the second order condition is satised as in the following:
@2uc
@q2
=  2(1  )2(w + )2Nip(1  p) < 0: (46)
This gives us a su¢ cient condition for a global maximum of the certainty equivalence of the
households utility at the optimal q. The left hand side of (45) represents the marginal
benet of taking an additional sick child to health care. On the left hand side, the rst
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positive term comes from the expected value of E(y   D), representing that, if an
additional sick child is taken to hospital and she survives, the household would get more
wage and feel less pain of bereavement. The second positive term originates in disutility
from variance,  V ar(y   D), thereby meaning that taking another sick children to
hospitals lowers the disutility from variance. It is also worth noticing that the marginal
benet varies with  and p which are interdependent on each other. The marginal cost,
shown on the right hand side of (45), is the opportunity cost of taking an additional sick
child to health care in terms of the period-two price. Given r, the marginal cost depends
only on c in the model.
From (45), the closed-form solution for the optimal proportion of sick chilren receiving
health care, q, is expressed as a function of exogenous variables including three health care
policy variables , p and c:
q = q(; p; c) =
(1  )(w + )p+ 2(1  )(w + )2p(1  p)  (1 + r)c

; (47)
where
 = 2(1  )2(w + )2p(1  p) > 0, (48)
and, for conveniencesake, is reasonably assumed to be a constant.
2.2.2 The Comparative Statics
In this model, there are three di¤erent policy options for health authorities to improve
their public health: raising the quality of health care (lowering ), providing preventive
care (lowering p) and reducing the cost of health care (lowering c). The equation (34)
obviously shows that the number of children who die decreases as the optimal number of
sick children taken to hospitals increases. Policymakers can use three health care policy
options to encourage poor parents to take more sick children to hospitals. Therefore, we
now pay attention to the e¤ects of three policy options, , p and c; on the optimal number
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of sick children who receive medical treatments, q. Totally di¤erentiating (47), we obtain
dq =
@q
@
d +
@q
@p
dp+
@q
@c
dc; (49)
where
@q
@
=
 (w + )p  2(w + )2p(1  p)

< 0; (50)
@q
@p
=
(1  )(w + ) + 2(1  )(w + )2   4(1  )(w + )2p

and (51)
@q
@c
=  1 + r

< 0: (52)
2.2.2.1 Improving the quality of health care
Based upon (50), we can examine the e¤ect of a change in  on q. In (50), ceteris
paribus, q is basically a decreasing linear function of . In other words, as the quality of
health care improves, more sick children are taken to hospitals. As  decreases, there is
greater likelihood that sick children who are medically treated will survive, and thus
E(y   D) increases and V ar(y   D) decreases. From (47), we derive
lim
!0
q = qmax() =
(w + )p+ 2(w + )2p(1  p)  (1 + r)c

and (53)
lim
!1
q = qmin() =  
(1 + r)c

< 0: (54)
When  is su¢ ciently close to zero, q can be made as close to a maximum qmax(). In
contrast, as  is closer to one; q theoretically approaches its negative minimum value,
qmin(). Also, q
 is equal to zero at a value b, which is denitely less than one from (54)
and is called the threshold level of , where
b = 1 + (w + )p  (1 + r)c
2(w + )2p(1  p) < 1: (55)
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For  2 [b; 1); that is, until the quality of health care improves over the threshold level, b,
no sick child is taken to hospitals, because the cost of taking a sick child to health care
providers exceeds its benet. As  decreases from b to zero, q turns to be positive and
continues to increase at the same rate.
However, the e¤ect of a change in  on q varies with p. In other words, the slope of q
with respect to  changes according to p. We know that (50) is a function of p and thus
@
@p

@q
@

=
 (w + )  2(w + )2 + 4(w + )2p

; (56)
where the benecial e¤ect of an improvement in  on q achieves the maximum level at a
critical point
ep = 1
2
+
1
4(w + )
;
1
2
< ep < 1: (57)
As p diverges from ep, the benecial e¤ect of an improvement in  on q dies away.
Obviously, an improvement in  is the most benecial to poor households when they take
as many sick children as possible to hospital. If p = 0, there would be no marginal benet
of taking a sick child to hospital, because her illness would obviously not be severe and
thus she would denitely survive without going to hospital. If p = 1, parents would know
that she is, for sure, severely sick. Thus, there would be no marginal benet coming from
less variance. Intuitively, we nd that extremely good or bad provision of preventive care
undermines the benecial e¤ect of an improvement in the quality of health care.
2.2.2.2 Providing more preventive care
In (51), we can see how a change in p a¤ects q. The function q is a quadratic
function of p. The second derivative of q with respect to p is obtained as
@2q
@p2
=
 4(1  )(w + )2

< 0; (58)
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which gives us a su¢ cient condition for a global maximum, qmax(p). From (47), we get
lim
p!0
q = qmin(p) =  
(1 + r)c

< 0 and (59)
lim
p!1
q =
(1  )(w + )  (1 + r)c

: (60)
Also, q attains its global maximum,
qmax(p) =
(1  ) [2(w + ) + 1]2   8(1 + r)c

; (61)
at a critical point ep in (57). The function q is an inverse U-shaped curve in p. If we assume
that qmax(p) is positive, then ep is located between bpL and bpH , where 0 < bpL < bpH < 1,
making q equal to zero. Intuitively, when p is very low (less than bpL) or high (greater thanbpH), that is, the probability that a child is severely sick is very low or high, poor families
dont take any sick child to health care providers because, in both cases, the cost of taking
a sick child to hospital is greater than its benet. When p is very low and close to zero,
poor parents believe that their sick children will survive because their illness is not
expected to be severe. In this case, there is no reason for them to see a doctor. Also, when
p is very high and close to one, poor parents are condent that their sick children are highly
likely to be severely sick and thus they are highly likely to die. In both cases, given the
xed marginal cost, the marginal benet coming from less variance disappears. Therefore,
poor parents are likely to choose to save their money rather than to pay for hospital bills.
In (51), the e¤ect of a change in p on q varies with . From (20), we know that
@
@

@q
@p

=
 (w + )  2(w + )2 + 4(w + )2p

; (62)
which is the same as (56) and is equal to zero at ep such as in (57). In this case, for
example, as  decreases, bpL and bpH converge towards ep. This can be simply interpreted as
that, as the quality of health care improves, the range of p where it can be e¤ective in q
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becomes narrower.
2.2.2.3 Reducing the cost of health care
The e¤ect of a change in c on q is shown in (52). The function q is a linear function
of c with a negative slope, thereby meaning that, as the cost of health care is reduced,
more sick children receive medical treatments. As mentioned above, the e¤ects of  and p
on q are interdependent on each other. Unlike this, the e¤ect of c on q does not depend
on  or p. The optimal q is equal to zero when c is equal to its threshold level, bc, where
bc = (1  )(w + )p+ 2(1  )(w + )2p(1  p)
1 + r
> 0: (63)
For any c > bc, poor parents dont pay for hospitals because the marginal cost of going to
hospital exceeds the marginal benet. As c is reduced from bc to zero, q increases at the
same rate, which means that more sick children have a chance to see a doctor. When c
approaches zero, q can be made as close to as a maximum level, qmax(c) as in the following:
lim
c!0
q = qmax(c) =
(1  )(w + )p+ 2(1  )(w + )2p(1  p)

> 0 (64)
for p and c 2 (0; 1).
2.3 THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF HEALTH AID
2.3.1 The Health Authoritys Utility Maximization
From the previous section, we know that three health policies improves public health
in a way that increases the optimal number of sick children taken to hospital. We now
suppose that a poor country receives health aid, T , from the world. The countrys health
authority allocates the funding for public health in a way that helps each household to
maximize its lifetime utility by choosing the optimal number of sick children taken to
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hospital. We still assume that there are three di¤erent policy options to improve health
care in the recipient country: raising the quality of health care (lowering ), providing
preventive care (lowering p) and reducing the cost of health care (lowering c). Let , p,
and c be the proportion of health aid allocated to lowering three health care policy
variables , p, and c, respectively. Then, the total amounts of health aid allocated for three
policy options are T , pT , and (1     p)T , respectively.18 We now assume that each
policy variable is a decreasing linear function of the amount of aid allocated for it. It then
means that
 = (T ), p = p(pT ); c = c((1     p)T ); T ; pT ; cT < 0 (65)
where T ; pT and cT are the rst partial derivatives of , p, and c, respectively, and are
given exogenously.
So far, the certainty equivalence of each households lifetime utility, uc, has been
considered as a function of three policy variable , p, and c. But from now on, ; p and c
are no longer exogenous policy variables but endogenous variables determined by their
amounts of aid allocated. Therefore, the function uc can be expressed as:
uc = uc(q; (T ); p(pT ); c((1     p)T )); (66)
where
q = q((T ); p(pT ); c((1     p)T )): (67)
Given the non-zero amount of health aid, T , the health authority chooses the optimal
allocation of health aid for three di¤erent policy options, , p and c = 1    p to
maximize uc. Thus, we now have two choice variables,  and p. Totally di¤erentiating
18The sum of the proportions of health aid should be equal to one. Thus, c = 1     p.
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(66) and (67), we obtain
duc =
@uc
@q
dq +

@uc
@
TT   @u
c
@c
cTT

d +

@uc
@p
pTT   @u
c
@c
cTT

dp: (68)
Dividing both sides of (68) by d and dp, respectively, and using (@uc=@q) = 0 from the
households utility maximization, we can get two rst order conditions as
duc
d
=

@uc
@
T   @u
c
@c
cT

T = g(; p; T ) = 0 and (69)
duc
dp
=

@uc
@p
pT   @u
c
@c
cT

T = gp(; p; T ) = 0; (70)
where
@uc
@
=  q(w + )Nip  2(q + 1  q)q(w + )2Nip(1  p) < 0; (71)
@uc
@p
=  (q + 1  q)(w + )Ni  (q + 1  q)2(w + )2Ni(1  2p) < 0 and (72)
@uc
@c
=  (1 + r)qNi < 0: (73)
In other words, for non-zero T , the optimal  and 

p must always satisfy (69) and (70).
The second order conditions are assumed to be satised, that is, g < 0; gpp < 0 and
ggpp   gpgp > 0 and this guarantees that  and p yield a maximum of the households
lifetime utility. If the functional forms of , p, and c are given, we can derive the
closed-form solutions for  ; 

p and 

c as functions of non-zero T .
2.3.2 The Comparative Statics
Given each household maximizes its lifetime utility by choosing the optimal number of
sick children taken to hospitals, and the health authority allocates health aid for three
policy options in a way that help each household maximize its lifetime utility, we wonder
how health aid should be reallocated as it increases. From (69)(73),  and 

p are a
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function of an exogenous variable T . Therefore, all other things being equal or held
constant, a system of two equations from (69) and (70) can be solved for the two
endogenous variables,  and 

p, as functions of T . Having set up the model above, we
perform comparative static analyses to examine how a change in the amount of health aid
a¤ects its optimal allocation for three health care policy options.
Totally di¤erentiating (69) and (70) with respect to  ; 

p and T and doing algebraic
manipulations, we obtain a system of two equations as
gd

 + gpd

p + gTdT = 0 and (74)
gpd

 + gppd

p + gpTdT = 0; (75)
where
gT = g

T
+ gp
p
T
and (76)
gpT = gp

T
+ gpp
p
T
: (77)
Therefore, using (76) and (77), we can express the system of equations (74) and (75) in
matrix form as 264g gp
gp gpp
375
264d
dp
375 =  
264g T + gp pT
gp

T
+ gpp
p
T
375 dT: (78)
In order for uc to attain a local maximum at  and 

p, the second-derivative Hessian
matrix
H(; p) =
264g(; p) gp(; p)
gp(; p) gpp(; p)
375 (79)
must be negative denite at  and 

p. We now assume that
D1(; p) = g(; p) < 0 at (

 ; 

p) (80)
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and
D2(; p) = g(; p)gpp(; p)  [gp(; p)]2 = 
 > 0 at ( ; p); (81)
thereby satisfying the second partial derivative criterion determining if uc( ; 

p) is a local
maximum.
Solving the system of two equations in matrix form (78), we obtain
d
dT
=
g(gp

T
+ gpp
p
T
)  gpp(g 


T
+ gp
p
T
)


=  ggpp   gpgp



T
=  


T
and (82)
dp
dT
=
gp(g

T
+ gp
p
T
)  g(gp 


T
+ gpp
p
T
)


=  ggpp   gpgp


p
T
=  

p
T
: (83)
Therefore,
dc
dT
=  

d
dT
+
dp
dT

=
 + 

p
T
: (84)
Thes results show that, as total amount of health aid grows,  and 

p decrease and, in
contrast, c increases. Intuitively, it can be interpreted as that an additional health aid
should be allocated for reducing the cost of health care so as to help each poor household
maximize its lifetime utility in the most e¤ective way. As health aid continues to ow into
the country, the proportion of health aid for cost reduction will be increasing at a
diminishing rate, while the others decreasing at a diminishing rate. At the end, , 

p and
c will be stationary when 

 and 

p are equal to zero.
The previous section can provide us with the reason for these ndings. The e¤ects of
improvements in  and p, respectively, on q are interdependent on each other. An
improvement in  is positively associated with an increase in q but it undermines the
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benecial e¤ect of an improvement in p. Also, an improvement in p has a positive e¤ect on
q but it weaknes the benecial e¤ect of an improvement in . In contrast, the positive
e¤ect of a reduction in c on q is independent of the improvements in  and p. For this
reason, reducing the cost of health care is supposed to be the most e¤ective in increasing
the optimal number of sick children who see a doctor. Therefore, allocating health aid
more for reducing the cost of health care is the most e¤ectively way to help poor
households choose the optimal number of sick children taken to hospital by maximizing
their lifetime utility given their budgen constraints.
2.4 CONCLUSION
In this study, we develop a theoretical model of public health and the optimal
allocation of health aid in a poor country. In our model, poor households choose the
optimal number of their sick children taken to hospitals to maximize their lifetime utility.
Policymakers are supposed to use three policy options to improve public health: raising the
quality of health care, providing more preventive care and reducing the costs of health care.
We show how these three policy options inuence the optimal number of sick children
who are medically treated. The optimal number of sick children who see a doctor obviously
increases at a steady rate as the quality of health care improves or the cost of health care
reduces. The e¤ect of a change in preventive care provision on the optimal number of sick
children who are medically treated is an inverse U-shaped curve. As more preventive care
is provided out of nothing, the optimal number of sick children taken to hospital increase
to begin with, and at a critical point of the preventive care, it achieves the maximum level.
As the provision of preventive care increases above the critical point, however, the optimal
number of children seeing a doctor rather starts to decrease and quickly reaches zero. Also,
two policy options, quality improvement and preventive care provision, are interdependent
on each other. In other words, an improvement in one undermines the benecial e¤ect of
the other. In contrast, the benecial e¤ect of cost reduction in health care does not depend
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on the other policy options. Therefore, reducing the cost of health care is the most obvious
way for policymakers to implement to increase the optimal number of sick children who are
medically treated.
Also, the countrys health authority allocates its health aid for three policy options so
as to maximize each households lifetime utility. Solving the model and performing the
comparative static analyses, we nd that the proportion of health aid for reducing the cost
of health care should increase, until all amounts of health are used for cost reduction in
health care. This nding also means that health aid used to reduce the cost of health care
is the most e¤ective in helping poor household maximize their lifetime utility.
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CHAPTER 3
HETEROGENEITY IN HEALTH AID: A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF HEALTH AID
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In poor countries, illness can decrease household savings, take away education
opportunities and reduce productivity, thereby perpetuating poverty. WHO and World
Bank (2002) analyze 127 case studies to examine why families have fallen into poverty and
ill-health turns out to be the biggest single factor in poverty. They show that one of the
most pressing agendas for poor countries is to improve the health of their people. We can
see how seriously the global community takes health issues in less developed countries by
looking at the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) out of which ve are the
health-related goals.19 The aid donor community has also paid attention to health
challenges in developing countries. As a result, recent years have witnessed explosive
growth of foreign aid for improving public health.20
Health aid has been widely credited with successfully nancing the improvements of
health care in poor countries. Levine (2004, 2007) surveys over 20 success cases in
improving public health in developing countries and nds that most of the cases succeeded
due to health aid. In contrast, however, the empirical literature has not reached a robust
consensus on the positive e¤ect of health aid on public health outcomes in the recipient
countries. To the best of our knowledge, there are three past studies on the relationship
between health aid and health outcomes, which are Williamson (2008), Mishra and
19The representative health indicators for the health-related MDGs are as follows: underweight prevalence
of under-5 children (MDG 1: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger), under-5 mortality rate (MDG 4:
to reduce child mortality rates), maternal mortality ratio (MDG 5: to improve maternal health), AIDS
prevalence, use of insecticide-treated bed nets (MDG 6: to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases),
use of improved water source, and use of improved sanitation facilities (MDG 7: to ensure environmental
sustainability)
20In reality, development assistance for health has increased from US $5.7 billion in 1990 to a record-high
of US $28.2 billion in 2010 (IHME, 2012)
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Newhouse (2010) and Wilson (2011). But they drew conicting conclusions. Williamson
(2008) is the rst to empirically test the e¤ectiveness of health aid to public health, using
development aid for health (DAH) data from OECDs Credit Reporting System and a
variety of health indicators such as infant mortality rate, life expectancy, death rate, two
immunizations (DPT and measles). She found no evidence that international aid to the
health sector is e¤ective in improving public health outcomes. Wilson (2011) extends
Williamsons (2008) study by using a new data set on health aid from AidData21 and found
no signicant evidence of a positive e¤ect of DAH on mortality. On the other hand, using
the data on health aid from OECD, Mishra and Newhouse (2009) empirically found that
health aid has a signicantly positive e¤ect on a reduction in infant mortality.
Why have we not achieved the empirical consensus on either positive or negative
e¤ects of health aid on health improvements in the country-level panel data studies, even
though there are many obvious success stories on them? Of course, one of the reason is
that a variety of panel data regression models often yield completely di¤erent results. In
this study, we argue that another important reason for that is that past studies have
ignored heterogeneity within health aid, which simply means that there are di¤erent types
of health aid and each of them operates di¤erently on health outcomes. A separate strand
of the aid literature has been viewing aid e¤ectiveness from another angle. The literature
on, so called, the "aid heterogeneity" criticizes that the majority of the empirical literature
on the aid-growth nexus have ignored the heterogeneous character of foreign aid (see, for
example, Mavrotas, 2005; Mavrotas and Ouattara, 2003, 2006). In other words, the
existing literature has not found no robust evidence of the positive e¤ect of foreign aid on
economic growth because it has evaluated aid e¤ectiveness in the aggregate. It has not
taken into account that aid is heterogenous and each component of aid yields di¤erent
e¤ect on the aid-recipient economy. By the same token, the reason that there is no
21AidData has been developed jointly by the College of William and Mary and Brigham Young University
as a new database on foreign aid which combines the OECDs Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database
with a range of data directly from both bilateral and multilateral donor agency sources. For the details, see
Tierney et al. (2011).
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empirical consensus on the e¤ectiveness of health aid is also that the existing literature
have used aggregate health aid data.
In this study, we rely on a panel data set of 119 aid-recipient countries from 1975 and
2010. We disaggregate health aid data from AidData and empirically reexamine if health
aid either positively or negatively a¤ects health outcomes and if there is heterogeneity in
health aid, that is, more specically, if there is a particular type of health aid that excels at
improving a particular type of health indicator. We disaggregate health aid data into three
health policy options: health aid for the quality of health care, health aid for the provision
of preventive care, and health aid for the cost reduction of health care. Wilson (2011) also
subdivides his health aid variable into nine categories for a robustness check. But the
author uses the nine sub-sector variables only to estimate their e¤ects only on infant
mortality. While Mishra and Newhouse (2010) use infant mortality only as their primary
health indicator, we use three di¤erent health indicators, which are child mortality, life
expectancy and death rate, as proxies for health outcomes. Williamson (2008) also used
three health indicators as the same as we do. But the author did not consider heterogeneity
in health aid and used aggregate health aid variable as the main variable of interest.
Williamson (2008) uses current aid variable as the main aid regressor in her
benchmark models. But we follow Mishra and Newhouse (2009) and use one-period lagged
aid variables rather than current ones. The use of one-period lagged aid regressors basically
enable us to partly tackle their possible endogeneity issues from reverse causality. It is not
easy to come up with good instruments for health aid since many macroeconomic and
political variables are all interrelated and a¤ect both health aid and health indicators, but
one possible solution is to use lags of the aid variables. The idea is that, while health aid
may a¤ect health indicators and vice versa, it is less likely that health indicators can
inuence past values of health aid and so they might be used as instruments for current
health aid variables. Another important reason for the use of one-lagged aid regressors is
that it allows health aid enough time to operate on health outcomes. In other words, we
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consider the fact that it takes time for health aid to bear good fruit. By the same token,
the other controls are also instrumented by their one-period lagged values.
For this study, four panel regression models are employed to estimate the e¤ects of
health aid on health outcomes. The baseline model is the least-squares dummy variable
(LSDV) model with country- and time-specic e¤ects. In this model, we nd that the error
terms are serially correlated. We basically compute cluster-robust standard errors that are
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. We also use two altenative methods to
correct for the serial correlation. The rst one is the xed-e¤ects model with a lagged
dependent variable. Under the assumption that the error terms follow the AR(1) model,
the use of a lagged dependent variable as a regressor is expected to mitigate serial
correlation and reduce omitted variable bias. It also enable us to remove omitted variable
bias because the lagged dependent variable is the best proxy for all omitted variables. The
second one is the xed e¤ects model with an AR(1) disturbance suggested by Baltagi and
Wu (1999).
The xed e¤ects model with a lagged dependent variable ignores the correlation
between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. This endogeneity of the lagged
dependent variable make the estimated coe¢ cients downward-biased (Nickell, 1981). This
"Nickell bias" is even bigger with smaller T and more severe autocorrelation. We suspect
one-period lagged aid regressors to be still endogenous because there may be omitted
important variables that a¤ect both yesteryears health aid and this years health
indicators. Moreover, the other control variables are not free from endogeneity. Therefore,
we employ the system GMM model to correct simultaneously for the Nickell bias and all
the possible endogeneity of regressors.
Our main ndings support the main hypothesis that there is heterogeneity in health
aid. Unfortunately we nd no statistically signicant evidence of the benecial e¤ects of
health aid on a reduction in child mortality. In contrast, we nd empirical evidence that
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health aid for the cost reduction of health care is the most e¤ective in raising life
expectancy and reducing death rate. We also nd there is heterogeneity in the allocation of
health aid. Countries with worse health status receive more Aid-P and Aid-C but less
Aid-Q. In other words, Aid-P and Aid-C are allocated by the needs of the recipients, while
more Aid-Q goes to countries where it will be more e¤ective.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 discusses the data, the empirical
specications and the estimation methods. In Section 3, we present the empirical results.
Section 4 conclude and draw a couple of policy implications.
3.2 THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
3.2.1 The Data
For this analysis, we use a three-year averaged panel data set of 119 aid-recipient
countries (N = 119)22 for 12 periods (T = 12) from 1975 through 2010. The data on health
aid are collected from the online database AidData version 2.0.23 In AidData, each health
aid project, if its purpose is specied, is assigned one of ten ve-digit purpose codes
starting with 12000 to 12281, according by OECD CRS purpose code. In AidData, there
are two more health-related aid classications: polulation policies/programs and
reproductive health (starting with 13000 to 13081); and water supply and sanitation
(starting with 14000 to 14082). But we do not add these two types of aid to our data set
because, for example, not all amount of aid for water and sanitation is focused on
improving health issues. We rather choose the way of controlling for the e¤ects of the two
types of health-related aid on health outcomes.
For all i and t, total health aid per capita (hereafter, Aid-T) in country i at time t is
categorized into three types by policy options so as to construct three heterogeneous health
aid variables. They are i) health aid per capita for improving the quality of health care
22The list of 119 aid-recipient countries for this analysis is provided in Table 3.5 in the appendices.
23The updated AidData 2.1 full version is now available at http://aiddata.org.
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(hereafter, Aid-Q), ii) health aid per capita for providing more preventive care (hereafter,
Aid-P) and iii) health aid per capita for reducing the cost of health care (hearafter, Aid-C).
Aid-Q contains aid for health administration, medical education and research and basic
health infrastructure. Aid-P consists of aid for basic nutrition, infectious and parasitic
disease control and public health education. Aid-C is composed of aid for supply of medical
services and basic health care.24 Figure 3.1 shows time trends in the ratios of three types of
health aid to total health aid for twelve time periods. In 1970s and 1980s, Aid-Q took the
largest proportion of Aid-T. Since 1990s, the proportions of Aid-P and Aid-C have been
increasing, while Aid-Q has been representing an decreasing share of total health aid.
Note: The Y-axis represents three-year averaged twelve time periods
Figure 3.1: Trends of Three Types of Health Aid (Unit: % of Total)
24For more detailed information of the sub-division of health aid, see Table 3.6 in the appendices.
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AidData contains both aid commitments and disbursements data. All data we use in
this analysis are in the form of commitments for two reasons. First, while disbursements
are theoretically more appropriate for the empirical study, the data on disbursements are
missing in many cases. The OECD CRS data, one of AidDatas largest sources, contain
many disbursement records that cannot be reliably linked to commitment records for the
same project. For this reason, AidData data exclude the records that only contain
disbursements. This means that AidDatas disbursement sums for OECD donors do not
necessarily reect the values reported by the donors (AidData, 2011). Second, in AidData
data set, "year" is commitment year. This indicates that health aid disbursed years later
after its commitment is considered to be occurred in its commitment year. This may
distort our empirical results. One reasonable way to make up the weakness of using aid
commitment data is to take the time lag between commitments and disbursements.
Unfortunately, the time lag between them varies across projects and donors. Following the
previous literature, therefore, we average our annual data over three-year periods.25
Futher, we use one-period lagged aid varibles as our main variables of interest.26 This
method also enables us to reduce annual uctuations and measurement errors and allow
health aid enough time to operate longer on health outcomes. Further, it allows us to avoid
endogeneity to some degree.
Our dependent variables are three health indicators: child mortality rate (under-5
mortality rate), life expectancy and death rate.27 While we employ child mortality rate as
one of our health indicators, Williamson (2008) and Mishra and Newhouse (2010) used
infant mortality rate as the primary health variable.28 Infant mortality covers only infant
25In general, the previous empirical literature on foreign aid has used ve-averaged aid data. But we rather
use three-averaged aid data to make our sample size bigger so that we can obtain more accurate estimation
results. WHO, OECD and World Bank (2008) nd that disbursements of health ODA are equivalent to
more than 80% of the average annual commitment over the previous three to ve years.
26Wilson (2011) used the same aid commitments data as we use. However, instead of using one-period
lagged aid variables, he assumed a one-year o¤set between the time a commitment is made and the money
is spent.
27Fore more detailed information on the denitions of health indicators, see Table A-3 in the appendix.
28For the reasons that infant mortality is a good health indicator, see Mishra and Newhouse (2010).
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deaths less than one year of age and mainly occurs in the neonatal period. Leading causes
of infant mortality are preterm birth, birth asphyxia (lack of breathing at birth), Sudden
Infant Dealth Syndrome (SIDS) and various infections.29 Therefore, infant mortality
cannot cover childrens death occured after their rst birthday mainly by malnutrition and
infectious and parasitic disease at which our Aid-P variable is targeted. Thus, child
mortality rate is more appropriate than infant mortality as a dependent variable that is
expected to be a¤ected by health aid.30 As one of the primary health indicators, life
expectancy tells how long a person on average is likely to live. Actually, it is also highly
correlated with infant and child mortality rates.31 Changes in income, health conditions,
and education are constantly occurring and will a¤ect life expectancy in a country. Death
rate (crude) is also a good indicator of the general health status of a geographic area or
population. Unlike age-specic mortality rates, however, it reects the overall mortality
level of a population and summarizes the mortality pattern that prevails across all age
groups in a given year. Interestingly, higher death rate can be found in some developed
countries with high life expectancy and low age-specic mortality rates, because these
countries have a higher proportion of older people due to lower birth rates. Therefore,
using death rate as a dependent variable enables us to capture the e¤ects of health aid on
health status in old age groups.
Except for health aid variables, the other variables come from the World Development
Indicators published by the World Bank.32 All the variables used in this study are averaged
over three-year intervals and are specied in logarithmic form. Therefore, our data set
contains twelve-period time panel for 119 cross-sections. Descriptive statistics for all the
variables for this study appear in Table 3.1.
29For more details, see Global Health Observatory on the website of WHO, available at
http://www.who.int/gho/urban_health/outcomes/infant_mortality_text/en/
30Of course, infant mortality rate and child mortality rate are highly correlated. In our data set, correlation
between them is 0.9924.
31In general, improvements in infant and child mortality rates result in increases in life expectancy. In
our data set, life expectancy is negatively correlated with infant mortality (-0.8544) and child mortality
(-0.8848).
32Data on the World Development Indicators are available at http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics (in Logarithmic Form)
Variable Obsevations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Child Mortality Rate 1396 4.278 0.859 1.723 5.808
Life Expectancy 1422 4.079 0.180 3.347 4.370
Death Rate 1423 2.312 0.458 1.091 3.569
Aid-T 1182 -0.234 2.148 -13.428 5.063
Aid-Q 1136 -1.023 2.212 -13.428 4.511
Aid-P 868 -2.088 2.280 -8.818 3.981
Aid-C 918 -1.392 2.360 -10.994 4.496
GDP Per Capita (PPP) 1114 7.593 0.997 4.533 10.281
GDP Per Capita Growth 877 0.846 1.133 -5.704 3.811
Population, Total 1423 15.891 1.564 12.209 20.986
Population Growth 1339 0.624 0.679 -4.669 2.312
Improved Water Source 815 4.276 0.347 1.579 4.605
Improved Sanitation Facilities 804 3.790 0.758 0.861 4.605
Birth Rate 1423 3.414 0.412 2.050 4.056
Fertility Rate 1424 1.398 0.465 0.125 2.217
Political Rights Index 1319 1.403 0.532 0 1.946
Civil Rights Index 1319 1.429 0.420 0 1.946
3.2.2 The Estimation Model
It is not easy for researchers to search for the best specication and model. Often,
many alternative approaches yield di¤erent results in panel data analyses. For example,
Williamson (2008) does not include a lagged dependent variable in the model, whereas
Mishra and Newhouse (2010) and Wilson (2011) do. Also, Willamson (2008) and Wilson
(2011) use current values of health aid as a variable of interest, while Mishra and Newhouse
(2010) introduce one-period lagged aid to their model as we do. Wilson (2011) employs
nine di¤erent models in his analysis and concludes that the overall results are very sensitive
to specication and estimation method.
We totally agree with Wilsons (2011) comment on model selection that the choice of a
model should be driven by theory and by the features of the data. By theory and by the
features of the data, therefore, we also estimate a variety of panel data regression models
from the xed e¤ects model without a lagged dependent variable to the system GMM
model. For comparison purposes, we show all their estimation results.
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3.2.2.1 The Baseline Model
Our baseline regression model is the least-squares dummy variable (LSDV)
xed-e¤ects model with both country- and time-xed e¤ects,33 which is as follows:
Yit = +T
0
it 1 +X
0
it 1 + i + t + uit; (85)
where the subscript i denotes countries whereas and t denotes time, Yit is a health indicator
(child mortality rate, life expectancy or crude death rate), Tit 1 is a column vector of three
one-period lagged health aid variables allowing health aid to operate on improvements in
health outcomes over a longer time-period, Xit 1 is a column vector of the other lagged
control variables, i captures time-invariant country-specic e¤ects, t captures
country-invariant time-specic e¤ects, and uit is the remainder stochastic error terms that
represents the omitted variables. We prefer the LSDV model to the within-groups model
because we can explicitly obtain the estimated unobserved country-specic e¤ects.
GDP per capita (PPP), GDP per capita growth, total population and population
growth are introduced to capture the recipientsinitial economic and population status.
We include fertility rate and birth rate to control for the e¤ects of aid for polulation
policies/programs and reproductive health on health outcomes. In the same way, we also
control for the e¤ects of aid for water supply and sanitation by adding improved sanitation
facilities (hearafter, sanitation) and improved water source (hereafter, clean water). All the
variables for this study are specied in logarithmic form because the log-log specication
smoothes our data and allows us to interpret the estimated coe¢ cients as elasticities. As
we mentioned in the introduction, we also use one-period lagged aid regressors both to
tackle potential endogeneity issues and to allow health aid and other controls enough time
to work for health improvements.
33We run the Hausman tests to decide between xed or random e¤ects. We obtain three test statistics
as follows: 2(15) = 43.60 (child mortality), 
2
(15) = 100.49 (life expectancy) and 
2
(15) = 54.89 (death rate).
They obviously exceeds the 1% critical value in the 2(15) distribution. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis
that the preferred model is random e¤ects.
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Using the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data, we test panel
autocorrelation and nd that the error terms are serially correlated.34 The modied
Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson statistic (Bhargava et al., 1982) also tells that we reject the
null hypothesis of no rst-order autoregressive process in all three regressions. We suppose
that it is caused by persistence of the e¤ects of omitted variables. Under serial correlation,
the regression coe¢ cients remain unbiased but the high variation in the estimates causes
the OLS estimator ine¢ cient. Therefore, we calculate cluster-robust standard errors that
make inference fully robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation for large N and
small T panel data.
3.2.2.2 Correcting for Serial Correlation and Omitted Variable Bias
We now reasonably assume that in (85) uit follows the AR(1) model because our data
are three-year averaged annual data as in the following:
uit = uit 1 + "it; jj < 1; "it  N (0; 2"): (86)
We use two alternative models to deal with AR(1) autocorrelation. First, following Mishra
and Newhouse (2010) and Wilson (2011), we consider the xed e¤ects model with a lagged
dependent variable. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as a regressor mitigate
serial correlation because the lagged dependent variables implicitly include lagged error
terms into the specication. Moreover, adding the lagged dependent variable to the model
signicantly reduce omitted variable bias. Our xed e¤ects model with a lagged dependent
variable (LDV) is as follows:
Yit = + Yit 1 +T
0
it 1 +X
0
it 1 + i + t + uit: (87)
34The Wooldridge test results for the regressions of child mortality, life expectance and death rate are
F(1, 61) = 114.946, F( 1, 61) = 543.009 and F( 1, 61) = 259.581, respectively. They tell us that we reject
the null hypothesis of no rst-order autocorrelation at the 1% level of signicance.
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We also the cluster-robust sandwich estimator of variance robust to groupwise
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Second, we estimate equation (85) again using another panel regression model
specializing in a AR(1) disturbance, which is the within-group model with a AR(1)
disturbance suggested by Baltagi and Wu (1999). The within-transformed equation can be
used to estimate . Given , the panel-by-panel Cochrane-Orcutt is performed and the
within-panel means are removed. After that, OLS on the within-transformed data is used
to obtain the within estimator. We use a Stata routine, xtregar, to estimate this model.
For the within transformation to remove the xed e¤ects, the rst observation of each
country is lost.
3.2.2.3 Dealing with Endogeneity and the Nickell Bias
In our panel regression models, however, our one-period lagged aid regressors are still
suspected to be endogenous because, even though the possibility of reverse causality is very
low, there may be important omitted variables inuencing both one-period lagged aid
regressors and current health indicators. If they are shown to be endogenous, their
estimates from our OLS regression models would be biased. Also, other eight controls are
not free from endogeneity. They should be instrumented with valid instrumental variables
that are relevantly correlated with suspected endogenous regressors but are not correlated
with health indicators. But it is not easy for us to nd valid instruments for total 11 right
hand side regressors. In this case, the di¤erence and system GMM estmators can be good
alternatives for tackle endogeneity of the aid regressors because these estimators embody
the assumption that the only available instruments are internal (Roodman, 2009).
Nickell (1981) shows that the use of dummy variables to estimate individual-specic
e¤ects in a panel data model with a lagged dependent variable results in downward-biased
estimates when T is small. Therefore, the xed e¤ects estimator is no longer consistent
when N goes to innity with xed T . The "Nickell bias" approaches zero as T approaches
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innity. This bias is not directly caused by autocorrelation of the error terms. But if the
error terms are autocorrelated, it is even more severe. The reason for this is, even though
cov(Yit 1, uit) = 0, cov(Yit 1, uit 1) 6= 0 in (87) because cov(uit, uit 1) 6= 0 in (86). In other
words, Yit 1 is endogenous. The instrumental variable methods correct for the correlation
between Yit 1 and uit by replacing with [Yit 1. Using a Monte Carlo approach, Judison and
Owen (1999) nd that the Nickell bias for dynamic panel data models can be sizeable, even
when T = 20. Considering that our panel data set consists of 12 periods (T = 12), our
xed e¤ects model with a lagged dependent variable is not free from the Nickell bias.
In order to remedy the Nickell bias and the endogeneity of regressors, the econometric
literature has suggested a number of consistent instrumental variable (IV) and generalized
method of moments (GMM) estimators, such as the Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator
(Anderson-Hsiao, 1982), the rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991)
and the system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) and the bias-correction of
least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator (Bruno, 2005a, 2005b; Bun and Carree,
2005a, 2005b). Buddelmeyer et al. (2008) show that, when N is very large, the GMM
estimators outperform the others. Flannery and Hankins (2013) conrm that the GMM
estimators perform well in the presence of endogenous regressors and, in particular, the
system GMM estimates are more consistent and accurate across a range of endogeneity in
the presence of serial correlation.
Another advantage of the GMM estimators is to allow us to explore the nature of the
allocation of health aid by shedding light on the direction of the bias and the sign of the
feedback e¤ect. We expect that there is also heterogeneity in the allocation of health aid,
that is, di¤erent types of health aid is allocated to the recipients in di¤erent ways.
For this study, all things considered, the Blundell and Bonds (1998) system GMM
estimator is chosen to tackle the Nickell bias and the endogeneity of health aid regressors.
In the system GMM specication, the level equation is the same as (87) and the
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rst-di¤erenced equation is as follows:
Yit =  (Yit 1) + 

T
0
it 1

 +

X
0
it 1

 +t +uit: (88)
Actually, three aid regressor are policy variables that are used systematically by the donor
community to achieve certain health outcomes and thus they change to reect the feedback
from health indicators. In this model, therefore, they are treated as endogenous variables
that has the property that E(uitj T1;:::;Tit 1) 6= 0. We also treat the other control variables
in a vector of Xit 1 as endogenous variables whose property is that E(uitj X1;:::;Xit 1) = 0
for all t. We treat the time-xed e¤ects as strictly exogenous.
We use a popular user-written routine, xtabond2, suggested by Roodman (2009) to
estimate our system GMM models. We employ two-step GMM rather than one-step GMM
to obtain more asymptotically e¢ cient estimates. To correct for severe downward bias of
the e¢ cient two-step GMM estimators in small samples, we also apply the Windmeijer
nite-sample correction (Windmeijer, 2005) to these standard errors.
Lagged di¤erences of the endogenous variables in (88) are used as instruments in the
level equation (87), while their lagged levels in (87) are introduced as instruments in the
rst-di¤erenced equation (88). Roodman (2009) warns that adding too many instruments
increases nite-sample bias and weaken the Hansen J tests power by producing
nonsensically high p-values of 1.000. Interestingly, his stata routine, xtabond2, is designed
to warn when instruments outnumber panel units, as a minimally arbitrary rule of thumb
(Roodman, 2009). Thus, we try to minimize the number of instruments used in the system
GMM model. In our system GMM estimation, therefore, suspected endogenous regressors
are instrumented with only lag two of the levels for the rst-di¤erenced data and with only
lag one of the di¤erences for the level data. The time xed-e¤ects are assumed to be
exogenous and enters instrument matrix on its own.
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3.3 THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
3.3.1 The E¤ects of Health Aid on Child Mortality
The e¤ects of di¤erent types of per capita health aid on child mortality are shown in
Table 3.2. As expected, four alternative models yields di¤erent results. In specication
(1b), the Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson statistics tells that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the regression of child mortality has a AR(1) disturbance. In specication
(2), Hansens J-statitic indicates that all instruments in the system GMM model are
exogenous.
Unfortunately, we cannot nd any signicant evidence of health aid on reducing child
mortality, which is consistent with Williamsons (2008) and Wilsons (2011) conclusions.
But we nd that three types of aid are allocated di¤erently to the recipients. The
estimated co¢ cient on Aid-Q in specication (1) is negative and statistically signicant at
the 10% level of signicance. In specication (1a) and (1b), it is still negative but no longer
signicant. But, this negative coe¢ cient on Aid-Q may be biased from endogeneity. After
tackling the Nickell bias and potential endogeneity, however, it turns to be positive in
specication (2). This indicates that, in specication (1)(1b), it may be biased downwards
due to a negative correlation between the unexplained components of child mortality with
Aid-Q. Intuitively, this suggests that more Aid-Q is distributed toward countries with lower
child mortality. This is consistent with Wilsons (2011) health aid allocation story that
donor countries put in place policies that are designed to give more health aid to countries
where child mortality declined more steeply.
If we pay attention to Aid-P and Aid-C, their estimated signs in specication (1) and
(1b) are positive. But after adding the lagged dependent variable and further avoiding the
Nickell bias and endogeneity, they turn to be negative. This results from the removal of
positive reverse causality. This suggests that more Aid-P and Aid-C go to countries with
higher child mortality.
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Table 3.2: The Estimated E¤ects of Health Aid on Child Mortality
(1) (1a) (1b) (2)
Model FE-LSDV LDV FE: AR(1) Error System GMM
Child Mortality (L1) 0.842*** (9.97) 1.053*** (34.97)
Aid-Q (L1) -0.0165* (-1.86) -0.00319 (-0.87) -0.0414 (-1.10) 0.00371 (0.63)
Aid-P (L1) 0.00692 (1.00) -0.00126 (-0.43) 0.000269 (0.09) -0.000168 (-0.03)
Aid-C (L1) 0.00538 (1.00) -0.00214 (-0.81) 0.000919 (0.29) -0.000568 (-0.11)
GDP per capita (L1) -0.0707 (-0.89) -0.0316 (-0.97) -0.0260 (-0.37) 0.0241 (0.97)
GDP Growth (L1) 0.00488 (0.71) -0.00631* (-1.45) 0.00518 (1.27) -0.0201*** (-2.68)
Total Pop. (L1) 0.244 (0.71) 0.0972 (0.74) -0.0707 (-0.82) -0.0139 (-1.52)
Pop. Growth (L1) 0.00236 (0.08) 0.00763 (0.55) -0.00820 (-0.91) -0.00949 (-0.45)
Fertility Rate (L1) 0.0954 (0.33) 0.135 (0.83) 0.338 (1.29) -0.00885 (-0.06)
Birth Rate (L1) 0.413 (1.11) -0.0654 (-0.34) 0.0739 (0.30) -0.0213 (-0.18)
Clean Water (L1) -0.110 (-0.51) -0.0662 (-0.70) -0.566 (-1.65) 0.0127 (0.31)
Sanitation (L1) -0.0890 (-0.86) -0.0233 (-0.61) 0.0126 (0.06) -0.0186 (-0.66)
Constant 0.201 (0.03) -0.410 (-0.19) -0.103** (-2.40) -0.164 (-0.44)
Observation 358 358 255 358
Adj. R2 0.989 0.997
Bhargava et al. DW 0.717
# of IVs 132
AB-AR(1) (P-value) 0.545
AB-AR(2) (P-value) 0.152
Hansens J (P-value) 0.975
Note: i) Both country and time xed e¤ects are included.
ii) * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01, iii) T-statistics in parenthesis
We have another example supporting that there is endogeneity in specication
(1)(1b). The coe¢ cient on GDP per capita growth has the unexpected positive sign in
specication (1) and (1b). After adding the lagged dependent variable, it turns to be
negative and statistically signicant at the 10% level of signicance. In specication (2), it
is statistically signicant at the 5% level and its magnitude in absolute terms gets much
bigger than that in specication (1a). This indicates that it may be upward-biased because
of a positive correlation between the unobserved components of child mortality and GDP
per capita growth. This positive correlation makes sense because developing countries that
have higher child mortality than developed countries also have higher growth rates.
We now turn to the e¤ects of other controls on child mortality. The estimated
co¢ cients on the lagged dependent variable, which is close to one in specication (1a) and
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a little bit over one in specication (2), show us that child mortality is highly persistent.
This result is consistent with Mishra and Newhouses (2010) and suggests that a virtuous
or vicious circle of child mortality exists in each country (Mishra and Newhouse, 2010). In
specication (2), as mentioned above, the coe¢ cient on GDP per capita growth is negative
and statistically highly signicant, thereby indicating that higher economic growth leads to
lower child mortality.
3.3.2 The E¤ects of Health Aid on Life Expectancy
We now move to the regressions of life expectancy. They appear in Table 3.3. In
specication (1b), the Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson statistics tells that we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the regression of life expectancy has a AR(1) disturbance. In
specication (2), Hansens J-statitic indicates that all instruments in this model are
exogenous.
We nd that specication (1) and (1b) su¤er from omitted variable bias and
endogeneity. In specication (1), the coe¢ cient on Aid-Q is positive and those on Aid-P
and Aid-C are negative. But after adding the lagged dependent variable as a proxy for all
omitted variables and avoiding the Nickell bias and endogeneity, each of them turns to be
the opposite sign. Intuitively, these results suggest that more Aid-Q is allocated to
countries with higher life expectancy, while more Aid-P and Aid-C go to countries with
lower life expectancy.
We now pay more attention to the coe¢ cients on Aid-C. In specication (1a), the
estimated co¢ cient on Aid-C is positive and statistically signicant at the 5% level of
signicance. The estimated coe¢ cient, 0.00134, means that, ceteris paribus, a 1% increase
in Aid-C is signicantly associated with a 0.00134% increase in life expectancy. In order to
interpret this result, we take a specic example of Sierra Leone which has the lowest overall
life expectancy in the world in 2013 by the WHO. From the period between 2002 and 2004,
Sierra Leone received health aid per capita of only 12 cents for reducing the cost of health
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care. For the next three years, Sierra Leones overall life expectancy is 45.04. If Aid-C
increased up to a dollar by 743.3% during the period from 2002 to 2004 in Sierra Leone,
then its life expectancy would have been 45.5 for the next period.
Table 3.3: The Estimated E¤ects of Health Aid on Life Expectancy
(1) (1a) (1b) (2)
Model FE-LSDV LDV FE: AR(1) Error System GMM
Life Expectancy (L1) 0.591*** (10.63) 0.975*** (22.35)
Aid-Q (L1) 0.00265 (1.14) -0.000195 (-0.22) 0.0000719 (0.08) -0.00224 (-1.61)
Aid-P (L1) -0.000338 (-0.26) 0.000904 (1.31) 0.000408 (0.58) 0.000133 (0.13)
Aid-C (L1) -0.000855 (-0.72) 0.00134** (2.24) -0.000571 (-0.80) 0.00217 (1.64)
GDP per capita (L1) -0.00241 (-0.26) -0.00430 (-0.80) -0.00709 (-0.44) -0.0173*** (-3.10)
GDP Growth (L1) -0.00267 (-1.12) 0.000165 (0.19) -0.00201** (-2.18) 0.00696*** (3.48)
Total Pop. (L1) 0.182*** (2.73) 0.0298 (0.82) 0.0429** (2.18) -0.00113 (-0.44)
Pop. Growth (L1) 0.00230 (0.41) 0.000689 (0.21) -0.000498 (-0.24) 0.00647 (0.75)
Fertility Rate (L1) -0.0221 (-0.37) -0.00839 (-0.42) -0.151** (-2.52) 0.00659* (1.96)
Birth Rate (L1) 0.0432 (0.52) 0.0494** (2.01) 0.0769 (1.39) -0.0843 (-1.66)
Clean Water (L1) 0.0535 (1.20) 0.0445 (1.21) 0.192** (2.49) 0.0252 (1.41)
Sanitation (L1) 0.0424* (1.68) 0.0129 (0.78) -0.0668 (-1.43) 0.0364 (0.40)
Constant 0.329 (0.31) 0.715 (1.01) -0.00177 (-0.18) 0.341 (1.34)
Observation 358 358 255 358
Adj. R2 0.983 0.996
Bhargava et al. DW 0.681
# of IVs 132
AB-AR(1) (P-value) 0.300
AB-AR(2) (P-value) 0.776
Hansens J (P-value) 0.993
Note: i) Both country and time xed e¤ects are included.
ii) * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01, iii) T-statistics in parenthesis
In specication (2), after the system GMM estimator removes the downward bias, the
magnitude of the e¤ect of Aid-C on an improvement in life expectancy is bigger than that
in specication (1a), even though the estimated co¢ cient does not quite reach the limit of
statistical signicance (p = 0:103). In sum, therefore, Aid-C is supposed to be the most
e¤ective in increasing life expectancy.
We turn to the estimated coe¢ cients on the other controls. The estimated coe¢ cient
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on GDP per capita growth has a negative sign in specication (1) and (1b). But this
negative coe¢ cient may be biased downwards because of a negative correlation between the
unobserved components of life expectancy and growth. This negative correlation reects
that developed countries with higher life expectancy have lower growth rates. After adding
the lagged dependent variable as a proxy for omitted variables in specication (1a), the
coe¢ cient on GDP per capita growth turns to be positive. In the system GMM model (2),
it becomes highly statistically signicant and its magnitude gets much bigger than that in
specication (1a). In specication (2), we nd that GDP per capita growth rate is
positively associated with life expectancy at the 1% level of signicace and an increase in
fertility rate also makes a contribution to an improvement in life expectancy. But
interestingly, GDP per capita is negatively correlated with life expectancy at the same
signicance level. This result is not what we would expect.
3.3.3 The E¤ects of Health Aid on Death Rate
Table 3.4 summarizes the estimated e¤ects of health aid on dealth rate. In
specication (1b), the Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson statistic shows that our baseline
model of dealth rate has an AR(1) disturbance. In specication (2), Hansens J-statistic
tells that all the instruments used to estimate the system GMM model are exogenous.
In the regressions of death rate, we nd that in specication (1) and (1b) the estimate
on Aid-Q may be biased downwards and those on Aid-P and Aid-C may be biased upwards
from important omitted variables and endogeneity. In specication (1a) and (2), after
adding the lagged dependent variable as a proxy for omitted variables and controlling for
endogeneity and the Nickell bias, we nd that countries with higher death rate receive
more Aid-P and Aid-C but less Aid-Q, which is consistent with our ndings in the
regressions of child mortality and life expectancy.
Table 3.4: The Estimated E¤ects of Health Aid on Death Rate
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(1) (1a) (1b) (2)
Model FE-LSDV LDV FE: AR(1) Error System GMM
Death Rate (L1) 0.676*** (9.91) 1.016*** (38.63)
Aid-Q (L1) -0.00620 (-0.90) 0.00206 (0.72) 0.00245 (1.05) 0.00580 (1.37)
Aid-P (L1) -0.000713 (-0.19) -0.00300 (-1.27) -0.00135 (-0.70) -0.000209 (-0.07)
Aid-C (L1) 0.000387 (0.14) -0.00519** (-2.62) 0.000330 (0.17) -0.00935** (-2.09)
GDP per capita (L1) 0.0149 (0.39) 0.0165 (0.78) 0.0492 (1.10) 0.0440*** (3.77)
GDP Growth (L1) 0.00823 (1.16) 0.00000954 (0.00) 0.00382 (1.51) -0.0203*** (-3.32)
Total Pop. (L1) -0.727*** (-4.02) -0.152 (-1.09) -0.105* (-1.88) 0.000580 (0.11)
Pop. Growth (L1) -0.0189 (-0.99) -0.00138 (-0.09) 0.00378 (0.67) 0.000164 (0.01)
Fertility Rate (L1) 0.378* (1.67) 0.100 (0.78) 0.562*** (3.40) -0.142* (-1.94)
Birth Rate (L1) -0.456* (-1.84) -0.331*** (-3.18) -0.435*** (-2.86) 0.0825 (0.93)
Clean Water (L1) 0.00212 (0.02) -0.0107 (-0.11) -0.377* (-1.72) -0.0718 (-1.31)
Sanitation (L1) -0.203** (-2.39) -0.0880* (-1.92) 0.0868 (0.66) -0.00354 (-0.26)
Constant 16.70*** (5.63) 4.792* (1.94) 0.152*** (5.72) -0.184 (-0.56)
Observation 358 358 255 358
Adj. R2 0.979 0.995
Bhargava et al. DW 0.645
# of IVs 132
AB-AR(1) (P-value) 0.720
AB-AR(1) (P-value) 0.617
Hansens J (P-value) 0.986
Note: i) Both country and time xed e¤ects are included.
ii) * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01, iii) T-statistics in parenthesis
We take a careful look at the estimated coe¢ cient on Aid-C. In specication (1a), it is
negative and statistically signicant at the 1% level of signicance. In specication (2), it is
still negative and statistically signicant at the 1% level of signicance. Its magnitude,
-0.00935, is almost twice as much as that in specication (1a). This shows that the
estimates on Aid-C in other specications may be biased upwards because the unexplained
components of death rate is positively correlated with Aid-C. This positive endogeneity
suggests that countries with higher death rate receive more Aid-C. In specication (2),
therefore, the system GMM estimator eliminates the upward bias from the endogeneity of
Aid-C.
In specication (2), the estimated coe¢ cient, -0.00935, can be interpreted as that,
ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in Aid-C is signicantly reduces death rate by 0.00935%.
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According to the CIA World Fact Book, South Africa has the highest crude death rate. In
our data, their death rate was, on average, 15.1 per 1,000 persons for the period from 2005
to 2007. During the previous period, they received only 12 cents of health aid per capital
for the cost reduction of health care. If it had increased up to a dollar by 746.57%, then
their crude death rate would have decreased from 15.1 to 14.0 by 6.98%.
The estimated coe¢ cient on GDP per capita is positive but statistically insignicant
in specication (1). But this coe¢ cient may be downward-biased because of a negative
correlation between the unobserved components of death rate and GDP per capita. This
negative correlation reects that countries with higher death rate are likely to have lower
GDP per capita. In specication (2), the coe¢ cient on GDP per capita is still positive and
turns to be highly statistically signicant at the 1% level of signicance. Moreover, the
magnitude of the e¤ect of GDP per capita on death rate is more than three times bigger
than that in specication (1). In this case, the system GMM estimator removes the
downward bias from the endogeneity of GDP per capita. This may reect the fact that
countries with higher income typically have a much higher proportion of older people who
are more likely to die. Other control variables generally have their expected sign. In
specication (1a), in particular, sanitation is shown to be benecial in signicantly
reducing death rate. Its magnitude is bigger than that of Aid-C, thereby showing that
sanitation is the most benecial factor on reducing death rate in this analysis.
3.4 CONCLUSION
Most empirical studies on foreign aid have focused on the relationship between aid and
growth. But they have failed to nd robust evidence that foreign aid promotes economic
growth. Meanwhile, the donor communty has paid more attention to global health
challenges and has increased their funding for global health. Keeping up with the trend in
foreign aid, empirical economists strive to nd evidence of the relationship between health
aid and public health. Unfortunately, past studies has not reached systematic evidence on
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the e¤ects of health aid on health outcomes. It is too soon for policymakers and scholars to
decide that health aid has no e¤ect on health outcomes. We believe that heterogeneity in
health aid is the key to solving this problem.
In this paper, we primarily examine our hypothesis that there is heterogeneity in
health aid, that is, di¤erent types of health aid work di¤erently for public health in
aid-recipient countries. In order to test our hypothesis, we rst disaggregate health aid per
capita data into three policy options: health aid per capita for improving the quality of
health care, health aid per capita for providing preventive care and health aid per capita
for reducing the cost of health care. Then, we empirically examine the e¤ects of
disaggregated health aid on three di¤erent health indicators: child mortality, life
expectancy and death rate. Based on our hypothesis, we expect that three types of health
aid operate di¤erently on three health indicators and there is a particular type of health
aid that excels at improving a particular type of health indicators.
A variety of panel data regression models are estimated in this analysis because
alternative models often yield di¤erent regression results. In a sample of 119 aid-recipient
countries from 1975 and 2010, we nd supporting evidence for our hypothesis of
heterogeneity in health aid. We basically ascertain that three types of health aid work
di¤erently for each health indicator. We nd no statistically signicant evidence supporting
the benecial e¤ects of health aid on reducing child mortality. In contrast, we nd that an
improvement in life expectancy and a reduction in death rate are driven mostly by Aid-C.
These results provide obvious policy implications to policymakers. If the main health
target is to increase life expectancy or to reduce death rate, more Aid-C should be
provided to achieve the target.
Also, we nd empirical evidence showing that there is heterogeneity in the allocation
of health aid. More Aid-Q is allocated to countries with better health status, whereas
countries with worse health status receive more Aid-P and Aid-C but less Aid-Q. In other
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words, Aid-P and Aid-C are allocated by the needs of the recipients, while Aid-Q goes to
countries where it can be more e¤ective.
3.5 APPENDICES
Table 3.5: List of Aid-Recipient Countries in Analysis
Total 119 Aid-Recipient Countries
Afghanistan Comoros India Mauritania Suriname
Angola Costa Rica Iran Mauritius Swaziland
Albania Cuba Iraq Malawi Syrian Arab Rep.
Argentina Djibouti Jamaica Malaysia Chad
Armenia Dominican Rep. Jordan Namibia Togo
Azerbaijan Algeria Kazakhstan Niger Thailand
Burundi Ecuador Kenya Nigeria Tajikistan
Benin Egypt Kyrgyzstan Nicaragua Turkmenistan
Burkina Faso Eritrea Cambodia Nepal Timor-Leste
Banglasdesh Ethiopia Laos Pakistan Trinidad & Tobago
Bosnia & Herzegovina Fiji Lebanon Panama Tunisia
Belarus Gabon Liberia Peru Turkey
Bolivia Georgia Sri Lanka Philippines Tanzania
Brazil Ghana Lesotho Papua New Guinea Uganda
Bhutan Guinea Morocco North Korea Ukraine
Botswana Gambia Moldova Paraguay Uruguay
Central African Rep. Guinea-Bissau Madagascar Rwanda Uzbekistan
Chile Equatorial Guinea Mexico Sudan Venezuela
China Guatemala Macedonia Senegal Viet Nam
Côte dlvoire Guyana Mali Soloman Islands Yemen
Cameroon Honduras Myanmar Sierra Leone South Africa
DR Congo Croatia Montenegro El Salvador Zambia
Congo Haiti Mongolia Somalia Zimbabwe
Columbia Indonesia Mozambique Serbia
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Table 3.6: Disaggregation of Health Aid According to the AidData Sector Coding Scheme
Purpose Code Description Policy Option
121 Health, General
12110 Health Policy & Administrative Management
01
02
03
04
05
Health Policy & Administrative Management
Health Sector Policy, Planning and Programs
Institution Capacity Building, Health General
Aid to Health Ministries, Public Health Administration
Medical Insurance Programs
Aid-Q
12181 Medical Education/Training
01 All Medical Education/Traning Activities Aid-Q
12182 Medical Research
01 All General Medical Research Activities Aid-Q
12191 Medical Services
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
Medical Services, Activitiy Unspecied
Laboratories
Specialized Clinics and Hospitals
Specialized Medical Equipment and Supplies
Ambulances
Dental Services
Mental Health Care
Control of Non-infectious Diseases
Drug and Substance Abuse Control and Counseling
Aid-C
122 Basic Health
12220 Basic Health Care
01
02
03
04
Basic Health Care, Activity Unspecied
Basic/Primary Health Care Programs
Paramedical and Nursing Care Programs
Supply of Drugs, Medicines and Vaccines (Basic)
Aid-C
12230 Basic Health Infrastructure
01
02
03
Basic Health Infrastructure, Activity Unspecied
Basic Hospitals, Clinics and Dispensaries
Basic Health Medical Equipment and Supplies
Aid-Q
12240 Basic Nutrition
01
02
03
04
05
06
Basic Nutrition, Activity Unspecied
Direct Feeding Programs
Monitoring of Nutritional Status
Provision of Nutrients
Nutrition and Food Hygiene Education
Household Food Security
Aid-P
12250 Infectious & Parasitic Disease Control
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
All Prevention and Control Activities
Other Infectious and Parasitic Disease Control
Malaria Control
Tuberculosis Control
Helminthiasis
Polio
Acute Respiratory Infections
Aid-P
12261 Health Education
01
02
03
Health Education, Activity Unspecied
Information, Education and Training
Public Health and Awareness Campaigns
Aid-P
12281 Health Personnel Development
01 All Sta¤ Traning, Basic Health Care Services Aid-Q
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